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THE OVERHYPED PATH FROM TINKER TO MORSE: HOW THE
STUDENT SPEECH CASES SHOW THE LIMITS OF SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS—FOR THE LAW AND FOR THE LITIGANTS
Scott A. Moss*
Abstract
Each of the Supreme Court’s high school student speech cases
reflected the social angst of its era. In 1965’s Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District, three Iowa teens broke school
rules to wear armbands protesting the Vietnam War. In 1983, amidst
parental and political upset about youth exposure to sexuality in the
media, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser and Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier allowed the censorship of an innuendo-filled
student government speech and a school newspaper article on teen
pregnancy and parental divorce. In 2007, Morse v. Frederick paralleled
the rise of reality television and online self-exposure in the 2000s: an
iconoclastic student, long feuding with his principal, unfurled a
cryptically drug-themed banner (“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS”) as national
television news crews visited his sleepy Alaska town.
Many depict the school speech cases as fundamental alterations of
student–school relationships, or even of the basic role of minors in
society. Tinker draws praise as the landmark decision on student rights
and on minors’ constitutional rights generally; detractors complain that
it “departed from the traditional . . . vision of education, which
emphasizes order, civility, and the inculcation of virtue.” And the
broader body of school speech case law is a familiar three-act Supreme
Court saga: the 1960s Warren Court declared a new right; the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts chipped away at it; and the Roberts Court
undercut it further, leading Tinker detractors to claim that the Court is
restoring their preferred traditionalist vision, while Tinker supporters
lament
that
the
Court
“eviscerated”
Tinker
with
“exceptions . . . swallow[ing] the Tinker rule” and “unquestioned
deference” to school officials.
This Article argues that a closer look shows a more nuanced state of
affairs than the prevailing narrative—that of landmark decisions
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sweepingly altering the legal landscape and handing parties dramatic
victories and defeats. Instead, even such watershed decisions as the
school speech cases show the limits of Supreme Court opinions, both
for the law and for the litigants themselves. Close factual examination
of these cases and the social settings in which they occurred shows not
only that each case was a major life event for the student, school, and
community—but also that each had a surprisingly modest real-world
impact on the law and on the student-litigants’ lives.
On the law, none of the student speech cases reshaped the legal
landscape to the extent commonly depicted. Tinker never had the impact
on actual schools that it had on paper: the infeasibility of most speech
litigation left censorship widespread and lawsuits rare. And schools’
post-Tinker wins never really gutted Tinker, as the unexpected
continued vitality of Tinker in the lower courts shows.
On the facts, each Court decision had an unexpectedly limited
impact on the student litigants themselves, as this Article documents
with both contemporary media accounts and new interviews with the
various students and their attorneys. Somewhat surprisingly, whether
the students won or lost at the Court bore little relationship to whether
they felt victorious or defeated. Some who lost at the Court, or never
reached a final verdict, express a striking sense of vindication from their
cases. Another losing plaintiff found vindication in further legal battles
and further speech shenanigans. Only one losing plaintiff actually
expressed a complete sense of defeat and largely left behind any
ambitions of issue advocacy. With their cases affecting them
unpredictably, the six plaintiffs in the four school speech cases are the
most vivid illustrations of the limits of Supreme Court decisions.
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 1410
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S SCHOOL SPEECH DECISIONS: A
FAMILIAR THREE-ACT SAGA ....................................................... 1414
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INTRODUCTION
The high school speech cases were reality shows before reality
shows existed, each a much-hyped reflection of its era’s best and worst.
In 1965, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,1 three Iowa teens, the leading edge of a nascent hippie
movement, drew ire and praise for defying their principals by protesting
the Vietnam War’s escalation with black armbands. In 1983, early on in
an era of angst about sexuality in pop culture,2 Bethel School District
No. 403 v. Fraser3 and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier4
allowed the censorship of quite varied student speech—an innuendofilled student government address, and a newspaper article on teen
pregnancy and parental divorce. In 2007, Morse v. Frederick5 paralleled
the rise of reality television and online self-exposure in the 2000s: an
iconoclastic student topped off his longtime feud with the principal by
unfurling an absurdist banner (“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS”) as national
television news crews visiting his sleepy Alaska town rolled cameras.
Each case featured very different speech but told a similar story:
students pressed the envelope, expressing themselves in ways that
schools thought were inappropriate.
Given their entertainment value, school speech cases tend to draw
media attention. “All the sudden Newsweek and Time magazine were
coming to my school, which was really strange as a 16-year-old,”
recalled Mary Beth Tinker, the most reluctant of the three co-protesters
in her case.6 Joe Frederick’s case also drew national coverage,7 some of
it even before any prospect of appellate litigation,8 and became a cause
célèbre for college students as far away as the Deep South.9

1. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
2. E.g., First Session on Contents of Music & Lyrics of Records: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation, 99th Cong. 99-529 (1985) (discussing age
ratings for music advocated by Tipper Gore, who cofounded the Parents Music Resource Center
that year).
3. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
4. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
5. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
6. Karen McCowan, Student Rights Icon Will Speak, THE REGISTER-GUARD, Nov. 28,
2009, at B13 (quoting Mary Beth Tinker) (internal quotation marks omitted).
7. E.g., Robert Barnes, Justices to Hear Landmark Free-Speech Case, WASH. POST, Mar.
13, 2007, at A3.
8. E.g., Sean Cavanagh, Alaska Student Challenges Suspension for Display of Banner,
EDUC. WK., May 8, 2002, at 4.
9. E.g., Brandon Niemeyer, What Would Jesus Smoke?, DAILY MISSISSIPPIAN, Apr. 6,
2005 (“[A]n obviously absurd protest sign at a school should not warrant . . . suspension. Much
like any other religiously-based sarcasm, i.e. ‘nuke a gay whale for Christ’ . . . ‘Bong Hits for
Jesus’ is not endorsing that Christians should smoke pot in honor of their savior.”).
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The school speech cases draw similarly great attention from legal
analysts, with many depicting the cases as fundamental alterations of
student–school relationships, or even of the entire role of minors in
society. As “the landmark Supreme Court decision on student rights,”10
Tinker arguably declared the American public school an “educational
public forum”11 and may have even more “elemental” importance as a
key case establishing constitutional rights for minors.12 Tinker
detractors similarly recognize the precedent’s importance when they
complain that it “departed from the traditional, communitarian vision of
education, which emphasizes order, civility, and the inculcation of
virtue[,] . . . embrac[ing] a more libertarian vision of education that saw
public schools as platforms for student free speech.”13 Scholars have
never stopped studying and debating the meaning of Tinker,14 which
remains one of the Court’s most storied free speech decisions.
The three post-Tinker decisions, all rulings allowing speech
restrictions, draw a similar mix of praise and criticism. Some argue that
the post-Tinker cases “eviscerate[d]”15 or at least “severely eroded”16
Tinker by establishing a “legal trend . . . toward unquestioned deference
to . . . school administrators.”17 One scholar colorfully opined that while
Tinker famously declared that students do not “‘shed their constitutional
10. Stephen E. Gottlieb, In the Name of Patriotism: The Constitutionality of “Bending”
History in Public Secondary Schools, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 497, 516 (1987).
11. Sheldon H. Nahmod, Beyond Tinker: The High School as an Educational Public
Forum, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 278, 294 (1970).
12. William G. Buss, School Newspapers, Public Forum, and the First Amendment, 74
IOWA L. REV. 505, 508 (1989) (describing Tinker’s holding but adding, “At a more elemental
level, in recognizing the free speech rights of public school students in Tinker, the Supreme
Court had to conclude that being a student in school, or being young, does not disqualify a
person from holding rights generally held by individuals under the first amendment”).
13. Kenneth W. Starr, From Fraser to Frederick: Bong Hits and the Decline of Civic
Culture, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 661, 662–63 (2009). Justice Thomas believes the same: “[T]he
history of public education suggests that the First Amendment, as originally understood, does
not protect student speech in public schools. . . . [T]eachers instilled a core of common values in
students and taught them self-control.” Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410–11 (2007)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. E.g., Kristi L. Bowman, The Civil Rights Roots of Tinker’s Disruption Tests, 58 AM.
U. L. REV. 1129, 1132 (2009) (demonstrating that “the student free speech rights articulated in
Tinker are built upon the struggles of the Civil Rights movement” for the symposium “Tinker
Turns 40: Freedom of Expression at School and Its Meaning for American Democracy”).
15. J. Marc Abrams & S. Mark Goodman, End of an Era? The Decline of Student Press
Rights in the Wake of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 1988 DUKE L.J. 706, 707.
16. Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The First
Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1, 81 (1990).
17. Id.; see also Gil Grantmore, Lex and the City, 91 GEO. L.J. 913, 920–21 (2003)
(criticizing the Court for having “greatly narrowed” Tinker, to the point of flatly contravening
the famous Tinker declaration that students do not “shed their constitutional rights . . . at the
schoolhouse gate” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate[,]’ . . . [t]he truth is . . . that they don’t
even acquire those rights until after they graduate from high school.”18
Others praise the post-Tinker three, deeming Fraser an admirably
“traditionalist opinion” that “turned away from Tinker’s libertarian
norms and ringingly embraced the . . . notion that public school
officials . . . have power to decide what speech is appropriate[,] . . . [on]
the vision of schools as the inculcators of the habits and manners of
civility.”19 A more nuanced view is that, though still standing, Tinker is
staggering from heavy blows, possibly on the verge of being knocked
out on the next hit: once the definitive precedent, Tinker has been
reduced to “the back-up rule[,] . . . applied only if the facts before a
court fall outside the framework of sexually lewd and offensive
expression ([Fraser]), school-sponsored expression (Kuhlmeier), or
expression that advocates illegal drug use (Morse)”20—and if the Court
“continue[s] to carve out exceptions to Tinker, . . . the exceptions will
eventually swallow up the Tinker rule.”21
The school speech case law thus presents a familiar three-act
Supreme Court saga, detailed in Part I. First, Tinker declared a new
right, just as the 1960s Warren Court did with other rights, such as
reproductive,22 voting,23 and criminal defense rights.24 Second, the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts chipped away at Tinker in the 1980s in
Fraser and Kuhlmeier,25 as they did to reproductive rights26 and voting
rights.27 Third, the Roberts Court in Morse undercut Tinker further, as it
did to reproductive rights28 and criminal defense rights.29
18. Grantmore, supra note 17, at 921 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)); see also Abrams & Goodman, supra note 15, at 723
(concluding that students “have no enforceable constitutional rights until they receive their highschool diploma”).
19. Starr, supra note 13, at 671–72 (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. Clay Calvert, Tinker’s Midlife Crisis: Tattered and Transgressed but Still Standing,
58 AM. U. L. REV. 1167, 1175 (2009).
21. Id. at 1191.
22. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
23. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
24. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
25. E.g., Ingber, supra note 16, at 81, 84 (noting, before Morse, that “[a]lthough Tinker
has never been overruled, its significance has been severely eroded” and that Kuhlmeier in
particular “applies such a lenient test to educational conflicts, the Court arguably has betrayed
the premise of Tinker that schoolchildren too have fundamental first-amendment rights”).
26. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
27. See, e.g., Adam Raviv, Unsafe Harbors: One Person, One Vote and Partisan
Redistricting, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001, 1002 (2005) (collecting cases and noting that although
Reynolds v. Sims and other “landmark decisions by the Warren Court established . . . the one
person, one vote principle, over the past thirty years the Supreme Court has chipped away at this
ideal”).
28. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
29. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (holding that evidence is usable even
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The premise of all this fanfare—the energetic media coverage, the
extensive legal analysis, and the view of the cases as illustrating a
decades-long Court shift—is that these are major cases. They are, but a
closer look shows a more nuanced state of affairs than the prevailing
narrative of landmark decisions sweepingly altering the legal landscape
and handing parties dramatic victories and defeats.
This Article argues that the school speech cases show the limits of
Supreme Court decisions, both for the law and for the litigants
themselves. Part I illustrates that each case was a major life event for
each student, each school, and each community—but then Part II
illustrates how the actual impact of the cases was more modest, for the
students and for the state of the law, in multiple ways.
Section II.A details how each case had a more modest impact on the
state of the law than in the common narrative of Warren Court
declarations of new rights undercut by later Courts. First, Subsection
II.A.1 notes that Tinker never had the impact on actual schools that it
had on paper: censorship remained widespread, while speech lawsuits
remained rare. With speech rights claims unprofitable for lawyers to
litigate, lawsuits are filed mainly by nonprofit advocates too thinly
staffed to sue every time any school, anywhere, oversteps its bounds.
Second, Subsection II.A.2 details how, just as Tinker had less legal
impact than many assumed, so did schools’ three post-Tinker victories,
which never really gutted Tinker to the extent often depicted. The
Tinker era of emboldened students defying authority continues: Joe
Frederick actually cited Tinker as inspiration. This Article reviews the
post-Morse case law to document the mix of wins and losses for
students pressing speech claims in the lower courts—with a notable
degree of student success undercutting portrayals of Fraser, Kuhlmeier,
and Morse as the end of student rights. Tinker’s surprising continued
vitality traces back to the idiosyncratic facts of the major student speech
cases, which leave lower courts free to interpret them as fact-specific
Tinker exceptions. Hard cases make bad law, in the popular cliché—and
the post-Tinker cases show that idiosyncratic cases make little law, good
or bad. Thus, post-Tinker students still faced a fair degree of censorship,
while post-Fraser/Kuhlmeier/Morse students still enjoy a fair degree of
success asserting speech rights. Others have noted that some Court
decisions have less impact than depicted. This Article shows that the
school speech cases typify this point, with not only the post-Morse
lower court case law, but also a mix of contemporary media accounts
and new interviews with the school speech plaintiffs and their lawyers.
when obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment, if police error was merely negligent); Hudson
v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (holding that evidence police obtained without undertaking
the required knock-and-announce is usable and that not all evidence violating the Fourth
Amendment must be excluded).
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Third, legal doctrine aside, there is an even more intriguing way the
school speech cases show the limits of Supreme Court decisions: the
limited impact that those decisions had on the student litigants
themselves. Section II.B examines the impact of the cases on the
students, not only through contemporary media accounts, but also
through new interviews with the various students and their attorneys,
some of which document facts not previously reported in any academic
or news publications. Specifically, whether the students won or lost at
the Supreme Court bears little relationship to whether they felt
victorious or defeated, validated or repudiated. Some who lost at the
Court, or never reached a final case verdict, express a striking sense of
vindication from their cases. Another losing plaintiff found vindication
in further legal battles, and further speech shenanigans, with the same
defendant. Only one of the losing plaintiffs actually lived out the
expected role of the losing party, expressing a sense of defeat and
largely leaving behind her ambition for a life of issue involvement.
With their cases affecting them in unpredictable ways, unrelated to
whether they formally won at the Court, the six plaintiffs in the four
school speech cases are the most vivid illustration of the limits of
Supreme Court decisions, each plaintiff entering adulthood bearing a
very different impact from his or her high school ordeal.
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S SCHOOL SPEECH DECISIONS: A FAMILIAR
THREE-ACT SAGA
A. Act I, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District: An Early Vietnam Protest Yields the First Student Speech
Rights
1. The Context: Escalation of the Vietnam War and Antiwar Protests
The myth of the accidental revolutionary is powerful. Casablanca
depicted a cynical American expatriate, apolitically running a nightclub
in Nazi-occupied Morocco, who reluctantly harbors a Czech resistance
fighter and shoots a Nazi officer. Rosa Parks, in challenging Southern
bus segregation, is cast as “a cleaning woman with bad feet who was
too tired to drag herself to the rear of the bus.”30 Yet Parks was an eyeswide-open activist who was active in her local NAACP chapter and
whose arrest came at the hands of a bus driver with whom she had
disputed segregation more than a decade before.31
Tinker features a similar myth, befitting its stature as the first major
student speech rights precedent. “Mary Beth Tinker didn’t set out at age
30. E.R. Shipp, Rosa Parks, 92, Founding Symbol of Civil Rights Movement, Dies, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 25, 2005.
31. Id.
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13 to enshrine her family name in a landmark U.S. Supreme Court free
speech decision,” media coverage recounted; “[b]y safety-pinning a
black armband to her blouse in December of 1965, the Iowa schoolgirl
was just trying to support then-Sen. Robert Kennedy’s . . . call for a
Christmas cease-fire” in Vietnam.32 But Tinker and her co-protestors
were no naïve children swept unaware into controversy.
In December 1965, Mary Beth Tinker, her older brother John, and
their friend Christopher Eckhardt decided to wear black armbands to
school “to mourn those who had died in the Viet Nam war and to
support Senator Robert F. Kennedy’s proposal that the truce proposed
for Christmas Day, 1965, be extended indefinitely.”33 They also planned
to “fast[] on December 16 and New Year’s Eve.”34 “I hoped,” Eckhardt
explained, “in a small way to influence public opinion.”35 Each attended
a different school in the Des Moines district: John Tinker, 15, went to
North High School; Christopher Eckhardt, also 15, went to Roosevelt
High; and Mary Beth Tinker, 13, went to Warren Harding Junior
High.36
Rebellious as this seemed to the school, the children were following,
not rebelling against, their parents. Eckhardt’s mother, the president of
the “Des Moines Chapter of the Women’s International League for
Peace and Freedom,”37 had recently brought her son to Washington with
Students for a Democratic Society, “protesting the war in Viet Nam in
[a] march . . . .”38 The Tinkers’ father, Reverend Leonard Tinker, was a
“minister without a church, under appointment by the Methodist
appointive powers to serve as ‘Secretary for Peace and Education,’” and
also “paid a salary by the American Friends Service Committee,”39 a
pacifist, interfaith group created by the Quakers.40 In the Tinker home,
“Viet Nam and the political and moral implications [were] discussed
quite often,” John Tinker testified.41
Despite this pacifist community, antiwar sentiment was not yet
widespread. Through the middle of 1965, American casualties in
32. McCowan, supra note 6.
33. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 972 (S.D. Iowa
1966).
34. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
35. Brief for Petitioners, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) (No. 21), 1968 WL 112602, at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. Tinker, 258 F. Supp. at 972 n.1.
37. Brief for Respondents, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) (No. 21), 1968 WL 112603, at *17.
38. Id. at *4.
39. Id.
40. American Friends Service Committee, Mission & Values, http://afsc.org/mission-andvalues (last visited Aug. 30, 2011).
41. Brief for Respondents, supra note 37, at *17.
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Vietnam had barely totaled 500;42 in 1966, they exceeded 6,000.43 In
mid-1965, only 72,000 American troops were in Vietnam;44 by 1966,
385,000.45 With American involvement still limited in 1965, the public
overwhelmingly supported the war,46 and “[i]n Iowa, . . . the Peace
Movement [was] a small minority,” John Tinker recalled: “I was used to
the idea that my beliefs were not very widely appreciated . . . .”47
Eckhardt’s gym coaches orchestrated “calisthenics to ‘Beat the Viet
Cong,’ as opposed to our usual, ‘Beat East High,’”48 and because of his
protest, “[m]y girlfriend dropped me and told me I could no longer
come over to her house.”49 More seriously, Mary Beth Tinker
remembers “threats on our lives and on our house. Someone called on
Christmas eve and said that the house would be blown up by morning.
Some other people threw red paint on our house and threatened to kill
me.”50
This mix of protohippie family and 1950s-holdover Iowa town made
the children a contradictory mix. A Boy Scout, paperboy, church
volunteer, and track team member who was voted holder of the
“cleanest locker,” Eckhardt was in part a stereotypically quaint
Midwestern boy—but he was also part of a disillusioned clique that “sat
in [its] own section of the auditorium [at school events] and refused to
cheer . . . or to rise for the National Anthem.”51 He did not come out as
gay until many years later.52 Mary Beth Tinker was the most
precociously rebellious of the three, having joined the protest in junior

42. Nation: Viet Nam & Korea: A Comparison, TIME, July 23, 1965.
43. Phillip Carter & Owen West, Iraq 2004 Looks Like Vietnam 1966, SLATE, Dec. 27,
2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2111432.
44. Nation: Viet Nam & Korea, supra note 42.
45. Carter & West, supra note 43.
46. USA Today/CNN Gallup Poll, USA TODAY, Nov. 15, 2005 (recounting that in late
August and early September of 1965, roughly 60% of the people sampled did not think that the
U.S. entering the Vietnam War was a mistake).
47. John Tinker, Tinker v. Des Moines Frequently Asked Questions, http://schemaroot.org/region/americas/north_america/usa/government/branches/judicial_branch/supreme_cou
rt/decisions/schools/tinker_v._des_moines/~jft/jft.faq.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2011).
48. Christopher Eckhardt, Tinker vs. Des Moines: The True Story, KNOL: A UNIT OF
KNOWLEDGE (July 25, 2008, 5:00 AM), http://knol.google.com/k/tinker-vs-des-moines#.
49. Questions & Answers: Effects on Relationships with Family & Friends, AM. BAR
ASS’N DIVISION FOR PUB. EDUC., http://abapubliceducation.org/publiced/lawday/tinker/
effect.html (last visited Aug. 7, 2011).
50. Questions & Answers: Perspectives Then, AM. BAR ASS’N DIVISION FOR PUB. EDUC.,
http://www.abapubliceducation.org/publiced/lawday/tinker/then.html (last visited Aug. 7, 2011).
51. John W. Johnson, Behind the Scenes in Iowa’s Greatest Case: What Is Not in the
Official Record of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 48 DRAKE L.
REV. 473, 476–77 (2000).
52. E-mail from Christopher Eckhardt to Scott A. Moss (Aug. 5, 2010) (on file with
author).
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high—but she also was “the most photographed of the three”53 because
the clean-cut thirteen-year-old Iowan so badly mismatched the
stereotype of the rabble-rousing protester: “the media focused on me,”
she admits, “because I was this cute, little Midwestern girl.”54
Unlike the public, school principals were unconflicted. Hearing the
armband plans, the local principals swiftly met and “adopted a policy
that any student wearing an armband to school would be asked to
remove it, and if he refused[,] . . . suspended until he returned without
[it].”55
The students’ defiance varied when they arrived with armbands on
December 16. Mary Beth Tinker took her armband off when called to
the principal’s office but still was suspended and sent home.56
Christopher Eckhardt was more combative: on his own, he “went
directly to . . . the principal when he arrived at school[,] . . . refused to
remove his arm band,” and was sent home.57 John Tinker chose not to
wear an armband that day: “I didn’t feel that I should just wear it
against the will of the principals,” he explained, “without even trying to
talk to them first.”58 Officials would not meet with him, so he wore an
armband the next day, December 17; after lunch, the principal
summoned him and he was suspended for not removing the armband.59
The three “did not return to school until after the planned period for
wearing armbands had expired . . . after New Year’s,”60 and returned
uncowed: “[W]e dressed in all black clothing for the remainder of the
school year in protest,” Mary Beth Tinker recalled.61
The three filed a federal lawsuit claiming violation of their First
Amendment rights, seeking an injunction against the school’s actions
plus nominal damages.62 The early proceedings were brief. After an
evidentiary hearing, the district court dismissed the case, depicting
school order as primary and rejecting the very notion of student rights:
“the disciplined atmosphere of the classroom, not the plaintiffs’ right to
wear arm bands[,] . . . is entitled to the protection of the law.”63 The
court deferentially presumed speech restrictions valid: “Unless the
actions of school officials . . . are unreasonable, the Courts should not
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
1966).

Johnson, supra note 51, at 475.
McCowan, supra note 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 35, at *5.
Id. at *5–6.
Id. at *7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at *7–8.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
McCowan, supra note 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 973 (S.D. Iowa
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interfere.”64 It was reasonable “to anticipate that . . . arm bands would
create some type of classroom disturbance,”65 the court explained,
because “debate over the Viet Nam war had become vehement in many
localities,” as unrelated draft-card burnings showed.66 Thus, “[w]hile
the arm bands themselves may not be disruptive, the reactions and
comments from other students . . . would be likely to disturb the
disciplined atmosphere required for any classroom,” making the antiarmband policy valid.67
The students’ appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit was hotly litigated but anticlimactic. After argument to the
three-judge panel, the entire eight-judge circuit ordered en banc
reargument—but split 4-4, yielding a one-paragraph order with no
analysis, concluding, “[t]he judgment below is affirmed by an equally
divided court.”68 Around the same time, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held the opposite. Far from letting schools restrict
speech whenever “reasonable,” it held that Mississippi high school
students wearing pro-civil rights “freedom buttons” constituted
protected speech unless it “materially and substantially interfere[s] with
the requirements of appropriate discipline.”69
2. The Decision: Newly Protecting Speech Rights in Three 1969 Cases
No Supreme Court case had upheld student speech rights before
Tinker—but then again, the pre-1960s Court rarely protected anyone’s
speech. Only in 1925 did the Court hold that state and local
governments are bound by the First Amendment.70 Through the 1950s,
it allowed criminal punishment of a wide range of unpopular nonviolent
advocacy: urging resistance to a war draft the speaker thought
unconstitutional;71 helping organize72 or being an officer in73 the
American Communist Party; and advocating industrial strikes, whether
to inhibit war efforts74 or just in solidarity with communists abroad.75
But the Court’s 1960s expansion of various rights included speech
64. Id. at 972.
65. Id. at 973.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 383 F.2d 988, 988 (8th Cir. 1967).
69. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966). The same panel upheld a ban on
buttons in another school where wearers harassed others. Blackwell v. Issaquena Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 1966).
70. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925)
71. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52–53 (1919).
72. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371–72 (1927).
73. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 497, 516–17 (1951).
74. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919).
75. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 671–72.
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rights, especially in two cases from 1969, the same year Tinker was
decided. Watts v. United States held that even an expressed desire to
harm the president is protected, absent real risk of executing the threat.76
Watts had ranted that if drafted and given a gun, President Lyndon
Baines Johnson was “the first man I want to get in my sights . . . . They
are not going to make me kill my black brothers.”77 The Court called
this “political hyperbole”78 not a real threat: “[H]is only offense here
was ‘a kind of very crude offensive method of stating . . . opposition to
the President.’”79 Months later, Brandenburg v. Ohio established the
modern rule that even advocacy of illegality is protected unless intended
and likely to produce imminent harm.80 Brandenburg, a local Ku Klux
Klan leader, gave an on-camera speech threatening: “We’re not a
revengent [sic] organization, but if our President, our Congress, our
Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it’s
possible that there might have to be some revengeance [sic] taken.”81
Overturning his conviction, the Court declared the modern
“imminent . . . incite[ment]” test that government cannot “forbid or
proscribe advocacy . . . of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely
to incite or produce such action.”82
Amidst these then-recent First Amendment precedents, the Tinker
Court reversed the dismissal, starting with deeming the “wearing of an
armband for . . . expressing certain views . . . [a] symbolic act that is
within the Free Speech Clause”83—a holding paralleled by later cases
protecting expressive acts from flag burning84 to nude dancing.85 The
Court then ruled for the students based on three points—all major
declarations of First Amendment law, but all of which came under
heavy fire in later cases.
First, Tinker rejected the idea of schools as specially speechrestricted institutions. The district court had concluded that “the
disciplined atmosphere of the classroom, not the plaintiffs’ right to wear
arm bands,” merits protection, so “[u]nless the actions of school
76. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam).
77. Id. at 706 (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. Id. at 708.
79. Id. (quoting counsel for Petitioner Watts).
80. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969) (per curiam).
81. Id. at 446 (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. Id. at 447.
83. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969).
84. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404–05 (1989) (noting that while the First
Amendment “literally” protects only speech and press, it “does not end at the spoken or written
word,” extending to “an expressive element in conduct relating to flags”).
85. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (holding that “nude dancing of
the kind . . . here is [protected] expressive conduct”).
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officials in this connection are unreasonable, the Courts should not
interfere.”86 Defending this holding, the school district titled its
Supreme Court brief’s second section, “Disturbances in Schools Are
Not Properly Measured by Identical Standards Used to Measure
Disturbances on the Streets, in Eating Houses or Bus Depots.”87 The
Court rejected that argument: “It can hardly be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable
holding of this Court for almost 50 years.”88 This historical declaration
was spurious; the cited “50 years” of cases addressed mainly different
rights, such as students’ religious rights and teachers’ speech rights.89
Despite its weak support, “the schoolhouse gate” is Tinker’s most cited
passage, reiterated by all subsequent school speech cases.90 Having
declared a student’s right to in-school free speech, Tinker strongly
denounced school restrictions of student speech:
[S]tate-operated schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism . . . . Students . . . are “persons” under our
Constitution. . . . [They] possess[] . . . fundamental rights. . . .
[They] may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only
that which the State chooses . . . [nor] confined to . . . sentiments
that are officially approved. . . . [A]bsen[t] . . . valid reasons to
regulate . . . , students are entitled to freedom of expression. . . .91
Second, Tinker required speech restrictions to be based on actual
evidence of threatened harm: “where there is no finding and no showing
that . . . [the] conduct would materially and substantially interfere with
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,
86. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 972–73 (S.D. Iowa
1966).
87. Brief for Respondents, supra note 37, at *23.
88. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
89. Id. at 506–07. The cases cited held as follows: (1) due process liberty disallows bans
on the teaching of foreign languages, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), and bans on
private (mainly religious) schools, Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); (2)
teachers can espouse or choose not to disavow communism or other ideologies, Keyishian v.
Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); Sweezy
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957); (3) freedom from compelled speech bars schools
from forcing Jehovah’s Witnesses to recite the Pledge of Allegiance, West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); and (4) freedom of religion bars devoting school
time to religious instruction, McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 209–10 (1948), holding
school prayers, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435–36 (1962), and banning the teaching of
evolution, Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107–09 (1968).
90. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007); Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 655–56 (1995); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988); Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1986).
91. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
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the prohibition cannot be sustained.”92 The district court deemed the ban
“reasonable . . . upon [officials’] fear of a disturbance,” but the Supreme
Court held “undifferentiated fear . . . of disturbance” insufficient
because “[a]ny word spoken . . . in the lunchroom, or on the campus,
that deviates from the views of another . . . [may] cause a
disturbance.”93 The evidence actually showed that armbands had not
“materially and substantially interfere[d]”94 with schooling or
“colli[ded] with the rights”95 of others: “[O]fficials banned . . . silent,
passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by . . . interference . . .
with the schools’ work or . . . the rights of other students. . . . [A] few
students made hostile remarks . . . , but there were no threats or acts of
violence.”96 In fact, “testimony . . . indicates that it was not fear of
disruption” that prompted the school to ban the armbands, but rather
that “authorities simply felt that the schools are no place for
demonstrations. . . .”97 John Tinker later detailed the mild classroom
consequences: “[O]nly the students sitting near me in class could see
that I had the armband on. The teachers apparently did not notice it. Or,
if they did, they did not make an issue of it.”98
Third, the Court closely scrutinized the facts to find improper
viewpoint discrimination: “prohibition . . . of one particular opinion, . . .
without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial
interference . . . is not constitutionally permissible.”99 Viewpoint-bias
evidence included the following:
•

“[A principals’] meeting . . . to issue the contested
regulation was called in response to a student’s . . .
want[ing] to write an article on Vietnam . . . in the school
paper.”100

•

“[A]uthorities, in prohibiting black armbands, were
influenced by the fact that . . . debate over the Viet Nam
war had become vehement. . . .”101

•

“[A]uthorities did not purport to prohibit . . . all symbols
of political or controversial significance. . . . [Students]

92. Id. at 509 (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. Id. at 508.
94. Id. at 509.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 508.
97. Id. at 509 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. RICHARD PANCHYK, OUR SUPREME COURT 57 (orig. ed. 2007) (quoting an interview
with John Tinker) (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
100. Id. at 510.
101. Id. at 510 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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wore buttons . . . [of] political campaigns, and . . . the Iron
Cross, traditionally a symbol of Nazism. . . . [I]nvolvement
in Vietnam[] was singled out. . . .”102
Thus, to the Court, the ban was based on “an urgent wish to avoid the
controversy . . . from the expression, even by the silent symbol of
armbands, of [war] opposition. . . .”103
So Tinker declared three cornerstones of student speech rights: (1)
schools’ institutional uniqueness yields no special authority to restrict
speech; (2) schools can restrict only speech proven to cause material
and substantial disruption or interference with others’ rights; and (3) the
facts must show the restrictions to be viewpoint-neutral (unless the
disruption results only from one viewpoint, and not just because of its
unpopularity). Tinker remains the most cited student speech precedent,
but later decisions undercut all three of these holdings.
B. Act II, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser and Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier: Reining in Tinker, but to an Unclear
Extent
1. The Supreme Court’s Evolution After the Warren Court
The evolution of post-Tinker speech law was part of a decades-long
Court shift. Tinker was one of the last decisions under the tenure of
Chief Justice Earl Warren.104 Though appointed by President Dwight D.
Eisenhower, a moderate Republican who would go on to criticize
expansive Warren Court precedents,105 Warren led the Court to broaden
numerous individual rights, from freedom of speech and reproductive
privacy to equal representation and school integration. Warren and
Justice William Brennan, another Eisenhower appointee, are much-cited
examples of how a president’s views cannot predict a Justice’s career;
“Eisenhower is frequently quoted as saying . . . Warren and Brennan
were [his] two biggest mistakes. . . .”106 But these “mistakes” reflect
that Eisenhower was uninterested in “entrenching a specific political
agenda . . . [and] more concerned with rewarding political favors and
pleasing particular constituencies,” as he appointed Warren “as a reward
102. Id. at 510–11.
103. Id. at 510.
104. Chief Justice Warren left the Court on June 22, 1969. Earl Warren, THE OYEZ
PROJECT, http://www.oyez.org/justices/earl_warren (last visited Aug. 5, 2011).
105. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., From Dred Scott to Barack Obama: The Ebb and Flow of
Race Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 18–22 (2009) (noting Eisenhower’s private
criticism, public ambiguity, and official support of Brown v. Board of Education).
106. Lori A. Ringhand, In Defense of Ideology: A Principled Approach to the Supreme
Court Confirmation Process, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 131, 158 n.120 (2009) (citations
omitted).
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for political favors” and Brennan to “curry[] favor with northeastern
Catholics.”107 Far from showing the unpredictability of Justices, the
Warren Court rulings “precluded subsequent presidents from following
Eisenhower’s examples. Today it is unimaginable that a President
would pay so little attention to a nominee’s political ideology[.]”108
Indeed, “[d]espite . . . celebrated examples . . . such as Warren,
Brennan, Blackmun, and Souter, . . . most Justices [are] broadly
consistent with” their appointing President.109
After Tinker, the Court saw ten consecutive Republican appointees,
seven from presidents (Richard M. Nixon and Ronald Reagan)
determined to shift the Court to the right,110 and almost all ten “more
conservative than his or her predecessor,” according to one of the ten,
Justice John Paul Stevens.111 By the mid-1980s, only two Tinker
Justices remained, and two 1980s student speech decisions increased
school authority: 1986’s Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser112 and
1988’s Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.113 Below are brief
discussions of Fraser and Kuhlmeier, which set the stage for narrowing
Tinker further in 2007’s Morse v. Frederick.114
2. Fraser: Restricting Sexually Explicit Speech on Unclear Reasoning
On April 26, 1983, at a Bethel High School assembly in Tacoma,
Washington, top student and inveterate smart-aleck Matthew Fraser
used “an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor”115 in his
speech nominating a friend for student government:
107. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From
Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 492
(2006).
108. David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Navigating the New Politics of Judicial
Appointments, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1869, 1887 (2008) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
109. William G. Ross, The Role of Judicial Issues in Presidential Campaigns, 42 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 391, 475 (2002).
110. Id. at 435, 439, 442 (“Nixon . . . criticized the Warren Court’s activism and
promised . . . conservative judges.” In 1980, “constitutionally-charged issues such as abortion,
school prayer, and criminal prosecutions,” as well as the platform on which Reagan ran for
president, made “abortion a litmus test for judicial selection . . . .”).
111. Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 23, 2007, at 50 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
112. 478 U.S. 675, 680–86 (1986) (holding that the school district acted within its authority
when it imposed sanctions for offensively lewd and indecent speech).
113. 484 U.S. 260, 267–70 (1988) (holding that school officials were entitled to regulate
the school newspaper’s content in any reasonable manner).
114. 551 U.S. 393, 400–10 (2007) (holding that school officials did not violate the First
Amendment when they confiscated a pro-drug banner from a student at a school event and
suspended the student).
115. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677–78.
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I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm
in his shirt, his character is firm . . . . Jeff Kuhlman is a man
who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he’ll take
an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn’t attack things in
spurts—he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally—
he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very end—
even the climax, for each and every one of you. So vote for
Jeff. . . . [H]e’ll never come between you and the best our
high school can be.116
“I wrote the speech about an hour before the assembly,” Fraser said,
knowing “it would cause some reaction”—but not a suspension and
graduation speech ban.117
Fraser sued, winning nominal damages, attorney’s fees, and a
declaratory judgment against the suspension and graduation speech
ban.118 Fraser then got to deliver the graduation speech he earned by his
classmates’ votes.119 After the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed, the Supreme Court reversed, reaffirming Tinker but
declaring a “marked distinction” between the speech in Tinker and in
Fraser.120
“The mode of analysis employed in Fraser is not entirely clear,”121
Chief Justice John Roberts tactfully noted decades later. In Fraser,
Chief Justice Warren Burger offered three ill-explained distinctions
from, and one point arguably disagreeing with, Tinker.
First, Fraser’s speech was harmful to youths, while Tinker “did ‘not
concern speech or action that intrudes upon the work of the schools or
[students’] rights.’”122 Deeming sexual speech especially harmful would
modestly distinguish Tinker, but Burger then dropped the point, only
pages later cursorily saying the speech was “insulting to teenage girl[s]”
and “could well be seriously damaging” to students “on the threshold of
awareness of human sexuality.”123 And the speech’s string of nonprofane double entendres (“he’s firm,” etc.) was not all that explicit; as
Justice Brennan noted, it “does not even approach the sexually explicit
speech” of obscenity cases, and “was no more ‘obscene,’ ‘lewd,’ or
116. Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
117. David Hudson, Matthew Fraser Speaks Out, FREEDOM FORUM (Apr. 17, 2001),
www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=13701 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
118. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 679.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 679–80.
121. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404 (2007).
122. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 508 (1969)).
123. Id. at 683.
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‘sexually explicit’ than . . . prime time television.”124
Second, “[u]nlike . . . in Tinker,” Fraser’s speech was “unrelated to
any political viewpoint.”125 But this potentially major political/apolitical
distinction came only in a short snippet in the penultimate paragraph of
the opinion, without elaboration.
Third, Fraser’s speech occurred in “an official high school
assembly,” implicating the school’s educational role to “prepare pupils
for citizenship . . . [and] inculcate the habits and manners of civility.”126
Only minimally explained here, the speech’s occurrence in an official
school setting later proved key in Kuhlmeier.
A fourth point was arguably contrary to Tinker: “[C]onstitutional
rights of students . . . are not automatically coextensive with the rights
of adults in other settings . . . . ‘[S]tudent[s] . . . [can] wear Tinker’s
armband, but not Cohen’s jacket,’”127 the Vietnam-era “Fuck the Draft”
jacket the Court deemed protected.128 Potentially contradicting Tinker’s
bringing established speech rights within “the schoolhouse gate,” this
point drew no further elaboration in Fraser.
Fraser’s various ill-explained rationales made it a Rorschach
precedent, viewable as either distinguishing or undercutting Tinker.
Kuhlmeier then clarified one speech type that schools can limit.
3. Kuhlmeier: Further Narrowing Tinker for School-Sponsored Speech
St. Louis’ Hazelwood East High School published its school
newspaper through the Journalism II class, whose teacher Robert
Stergos left midyear in 1983.129 Stergos’ replacement reviewed the
about-to-print upcoming issue, and then had the principal review it.130
The principal cut one article on pregnant students and another on
parental divorce impacting students.131 He thought the former
inappropriate for young readers, the latter intrusive into students’ family
privacy, and both excessively detailed about students’ personal lives.132
Student editor Cathy Kuhlmeier was outraged; a few years earlier,

124. Id. at 689 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 685 (majority opinion).
126. Id. at 681 (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 228 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. Id. at 682 (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979)
(Newman, J., concurring)).
128. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22–26 (1971) (holding that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments protected the defendant’s ability to wear a jacket with an expletive on
it in a courthouse corridor).
129. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262–63 (1988).
130. Id. at 263.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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“under a different principal, the same story ideas were printed.”133 She
thought the articles could help troubled students, later recalling: “[A]n
individual from our class ran away and ended up committing suicide.
Could the articles have made a difference for his life choice? . . . I will
always wonder.”134 Seeing the articles cut, “[a] few of us contacted Mr.
Stergos,” the recently departed teacher, “and he suggested we contact
the American Civil Liberties Union.”135
Like Fraser, Kuhlmeier sought injunctive relief; however, such relief
was unavailable for several reasons. First, the principal’s action was a
fait accompli: he “did not inform the student authors of his decision;
they learned of the deletions when the paper was released.”136 Second,
other students engaged in self-help, “xerox[ing] the articles and
distribut[ing] them to other students on the school premises.”137 Third,
by the time the Court heard the case, the students had graduated,
arguably mooting injunctive relief as to their articles.138 Continuing to
seek other relief—damages and a declaratory judgment that the school
violated their rights—the students lost in district court, won on appeal,
then lost at the Supreme Court.139
The Court ruled against the student authors, but unlike in Fraser, it
declared one specific distinction from Tinker. Kuhlmeier began by
reaffirming the basic Tinker rule: because students retain rights within
“schoolhouse gate[s],” they “cannot be punished merely for expressing
their personal views on the school premises . . . unless school authorities
have reason to believe that such expression will “substantially interfere
with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other
students.”140
But in viewing Fraser as allowing control over school-sponsored
speech, Kuhlmeier used broad language declaring schools, arguably
contrary to Tinker, speech-restricted institutions: “The First Amendment
rights of students . . . ‘are not automatically coextensive with the rights
of adults in other settings.’”141 In the “official school assembly” of
Fraser or the in-class writing of Kuhlmeier, a school can restrict speech

133. PANCHYK, supra note 98, at 62.
134. Id.
135. David Hudson, Cathy Cowan Reflects on Her High School Journalism Fight in
Hazelwood Case, FREEDOM FORUM (Dec. 27, 2001), www.freedomforum.org/templates/
document.asp?documentID=15516.
136. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1371 (8th Cir. 1986).
137. Id.
138. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 596 F. Supp. 1422, 1424 (E.D. Mo. 1984).
139. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 264–66 (1988).
140. Id. at 266 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506,
509 (1969)).
141. Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
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to its “educational mission.”142 Kuhlmeier also found that “public
forum” case law justified school newspaper control. Speech is most
protected in “streets, parks, and other traditional public forums . . . ‘used
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions.’”143 Schools are “public forums” only
if authorities “by policy or by practice opened those facilities ‘for
indiscriminate use.’”144 The Kuhlmeier newspaper was no open forum:
the teacher selected editors, assigned stories, and edited articles;
“[m]any of these decisions were made without [student]
consultation.”145 Even after teacher review, “the issue still had to be
reviewed by [the] Principal.”146
The Kuhlmeier Court interpreted Fraser as allowing control of
speech in “school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and
other expressive activities that . . . might reasonably [be] perceive[d] to
bear the [school] imprimatur.”147 This narrowed Tinker to only
“personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises.”148
Thus, “Tinker . . . need not also be the standard” for school-sanctioned
speech;149 “what manner of speech in the classroom or in school
assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school.”150
Yet Fraser and Kuhlmeier may reach more than just schoolsanctioned speech. The two 1980s decisions stressed schools’
institutional distinctness and control needs—arguments that failed in
Tinker. On these rationales, the Court limited non-school-sanctioned
speech further in Morse v. Frederick.151
C. Act III, Morse v. Frederick: The Roberts Court Further Limits
Tinker, Leaving Student Speech Rights Uncertain
1. The Context: Joe Frederick Versus His School, the Ongoing Saga
“On January 24, 2002, the Olympic Torch Relay passed through
Juneau, Alaska, on its way to the winter games in . . . Utah. The
torchbearers . . . [passed] along a street in front of Juneau-Douglas High
School (JDHS),” with network camera crews.152 This would be a big
142.
143.
144.
(1983)).
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 267 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47
Id. at 268.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 271.
Id.
Id. at 272.
Id. at 267 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
Id. at 397.
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event anywhere, but it was especially so in sleepy Juneau. Though
Alaska’s capital, Juneau is sparse and sprawling: barely 30,000 people
live among 2,700 square miles, and even with over half the population
concentrated in the urban areas, Juneau is one of the nation’s least dense
cities.153 It has just two main public high schools, Thunder Mountain
High School and JDHS, the one Frederick attended.154 The torch relay
was during school, so JDHS principal Deborah Morse announced that
students could leave class to watch on the street.155 Because the outing
was “an approved social event or class trip[,] . . . [t]eachers and
administrative officials monitored the students.”156
Unsurprisingly, the mass outing of small-town students to a
nationally televised event “became rambunctious.”157 Some were
“throwing plastic cola bottles and snowballs and scuffling”158—but the
scene-stealer, and the target of the school’s crackdown, was Frederick’s
homemade banner.
As . . . torchbearers and camera crews passed by, Frederick
and his friends unfurled a 14-foot banner bearing the
phrase: “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” . . . readable by the
students on the other side of the street. Principal Morse
immediately . . . demanded that the banner be taken down.
Everyone but Frederick complied. Morse confiscated the
banner.159
Frederick’s goal was “partly to get on TV as the Olympic torch
passed,” but mainly “to get under the skin of his disciplinarian
principal, . . . with whom he had a running feud.”160 In an earlier
incident, when Frederick sat in the school commons reading Albert
Camus’ existential novel The Stranger, a vice principal told him to
leave because his classes were over.161 Frederick refused—he was
waiting for his girlfriend—so the school summoned Juneau police
officers to threaten a “trespass” arrest.162 The next day, he sat while
153. State and County Quickfacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 4, 2010), http://quickfacts.
census.gov/qfd/states/02/0236400.html.
154. JUNEAU SCHOOL DISTRICT, http://www.juneauschools.org/schools/high_schools (last
visited Aug. 5, 2011).
155. Morse, 551 U.S. at 397.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 397–98.
160. Barnes, supra note 7.
161. Tom Kizzia, ‘Bong Hits 4 Jesus’ Goes to the Supreme Court, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, Mar. 4, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.november.org/stayinfo/breaking07/
BongHits.html.
162. Id.
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others stood for the Pledge of Allegiance and “was sent to the
principal’s office,”163 threatened with suspension,164 despite the
established right to abstain from the Pledge.165
But what did “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” mean? Frederick, who was
reading a novel about life’s absurd meaninglessness in his “trespass”
altercation, just thought it “funny, provocative and nonsensically
ambiguous.”166 “I wasn’t trying to say anything about religion . . . [or]
drugs. I was just trying to say something,” Frederick explained on an
ACLU conference call.167 Whether or not he meant to encourage drug
use, Frederick knew he pushed the envelope: “I had taken an American
Justice class,” he elaborated, and “decided to devise a plan that would
clearly be constitutionally protected speech and speech that would be
funny and at the same time embarrass . . . school administration.”168
With friends, he “brainstormed but could not arrive at a verse,” until his
girlfriend “pointed out a sticker on a snowboard that read: ‘Bong Hits
For Jesus,’” which he thought “perfect for the planned free speech
experiment.”169
The school saw the banner differently. Morse “thought it encouraged
illegal drug use,” violating school policy against “advocat[ing] the use
of substances that are illegal to minors . . . [at] approved social events
and class trips.”170 Contrary to Frederick’s image of Morse as an unfair
disciplinarian, the fourth-generation teacher and second-generation
principal insisted that she simply “carried out her responsibility” to
enforce “long-established school board policy.”171
After the outing, Morse called Frederick to her office. It went badly.
Morse suspended Frederick—and then doubled the suspension.
“Frederick said a five-day suspension was doubled after he talked back
by quoting Thomas Jefferson on free speech. Morse testified the extra
days came because he wouldn’t cooperate and name the other students
who held the banner.”172 “I went home immediately and wrote the

163. Barnes, supra note 7.
164. Kizzia, supra note 161.
165. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
166. Kizzia, supra note 161.
167. Barnes, supra note 7 (quoting interview with Frederick) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
168. Joe Frederick, Joe’s Story, STRIKE THE ROOT (Nov. 16, 2003), http://www.strike-theroot.com/3/frederick/frederick1.html.
169. Id.
170. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 398 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
171. Eric Hagen, Morse v. Frederick: Why the School Should Prevail,
http://www.publicsquare.net/content.php?pid=153 (last visited Aug. 5, 2011) (opinion piece by
counsel for JDHS).
172. Kizzia, supra note 161.
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ACLU,” Frederick recalled.173 Superintendent Peggy Cowan, like other
district officials, stood by Morse, arguing that “teaching students in an
environment that is conducive to learning is of the utmost
importance.”174
In court, Frederick lost on a pretrial summary judgment motion, but
the Ninth Circuit reversed, reinstating his claim.175 Former Solicitor
General and Clinton impeachment prosecutor Kenneth Starr then joined
the school’s legal team,176 and the Supreme Court ruled against
Frederick, reinstating the dismissal.177
2. The Decision: Further Reining in Tinker
Was Frederick really a school speech case at all? True, Frederick
was a student whose speech upset the principal. But Frederick displayed
his banner at a public event on a public street where students stood
among the public, in front of national television cameras. Though
acknowledging “some uncertainty at the outer boundaries,”178 the Court
deemed the banner “school” speech because the school sanctioned the
outing and other students saw the banner: “[It was] during normal
school hours. It was sanctioned . . . as an approved social event or class
trip . . . . Teachers and administrators were interspersed among the
students . . . supervising them. The high school band and cheerleaders
performed. . . . [A]cross the street from the school, [Frederick] directed
his banner . . . visible to most students.”179
Yet the Court then declared inapplicable the tests of all three main
school speech precedents, Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier.
Fraser/Kuhlmeier deference applies to speech “reasonably perceive[d]
to bear the imprimatur of the school,”180 but “no one would reasonably
believe that Frederick’s banner bore the school’s imprimatur.”181
Despite distinguishing a key Fraser/Kuhlmeier fact, Morse still cited
those cases as undercutting Tinker’s “substantial disruption”
requirement: Fraser “did not conduct the ‘substantial disruption’
analysis . . . [of] Tinker”182 and Kuhlmeier confirmed “that the rule of

173. Frederick, supra note 168.
174. Pepperdine University, Law School News: Supreme Court Issues Decision in ‘Bong
Hits’ Case, http://law.pepperdine.edu/news-events/news/2007/06/courtdecision.htm (last visited
Aug. 5, 2011).
175. Morse, 551 U.S. at 399.
176. Kizzia, supra note 161.
177. Morse, 551 U.S. at 400.
178. Id. at 401.
179. Id. at 400–01 (internal quotation marks omitted).
180. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–71 (1988).
181. Morse, 551 U.S. at 405.
182. Id.
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Tinker is not the only basis for restricting student speech.”183 Therefore,
while the Morse Court depicted the banner as “school” speech, it
effectively established that schools can restrict even non-schoolsponsored speech without “substantial disruption.”184
Morse left unclear what scrutiny level it applied, but it did announce
three principles—two of deference to schools, and a third based on drug
illegality. First, Morse extended the Fraser/Kuhlmeier rule that schools
are specially speech-restricted institutions beyond school-sanctioned
speech. “[I]t is enough to distill from Fraser” both that the Tinker
disruption test need not apply and “that ‘the constitutional rights of
students . . . are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults
in other settings.’ Had Fraser delivered the same speech in a public
forum outside the school context, it would have been protected.”185
Similarly, Kuhlmeier, though focused on school sponsorship of speech,
“nevertheless . . . confirms . . . that schools may regulate some speech
‘even though the government could not censor similar speech outside
the school.’”186
Second, Morse allowed punishment of “cryptic” speech as long as it
was “reasonable” for the school to think it unlawful advocacy:
“Frederick’s banner is cryptic,” Chief Justice Roberts admitted,
“offensive to some, perhaps amusing to others. To still others, it
probably means nothing.”187 It sufficed that “Morse thought the banner
would be interpreted by those viewing it as promoting illegal drug use,
and that interpretation is plainly a reasonable one.”188 Where Tinker
required the school to prove actually disruption, Morse required it to
prove only the “reasonable[ness]” of viewing the speech as “promoting”
some evil—regardless of whether the evil (drug use) occurred or was
likely and regardless of whether students actually viewed the speech as
promoting the evil.189
Third, the speech was about illegal drugs. The school argued “that
Frederick’s speech is proscribable because it is plainly ‘offensive’
as . . . in Fraser,” but the Court said that it “stretches Fraser too
far . . . to encompass any speech that could fit under some definition of
‘offensive.’”190 Rather, the speech was punishable because “deterring
183. Id. at 405–06.
184. Id. Tinker also allowed restriction of speech “colli[ding] with the rights of other
students,” but Frederick saw no “collision” arguments. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
185. Morse, 551 U.S. at 404–05 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682
(1986)).
186. Id. at 405–06 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988)).
187. Id. at 401.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 409.
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drug use by schoolchildren is an ‘important—indeed, perhaps
compelling’ interest. Drug abuse can cause severe and permanent
damage.”191 It cited legislative findings and various laws declaring “that
part of a school’s job is educating students about . . . drug use,” and that
“[t]housands of school boards . . . adopt[] policies . . . effectuating this
message.”192 And “peer pressure is perhaps ‘the single most important
factor leading schoolchildren to take drugs,’” supporting proscription of
Frederick’s banner, as “speech celebrating illegal drug use at a school
event.”193
II. THE LIMITS OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: THE MURKY STATE OF
SPEECH RIGHTS IN THE TINKER/MORSE MUDDLE AND THE CURIOUS
FATES OF THE SPEECH PLAINTIFFS THEMSELVES
The school speech cases were major events. As Part I details, Tinker
created a new right, while the three later decisions exemplified a
historically significant shift of the Supreme Court from declaring new
rights in the Warren Court era to progressively undercutting those rights
in subsequent decades. As Part I also detailed, each case was a major
social event, reflecting the social controversies of its era and drawing
substantial attention from its community and the media.
But precisely because they were such legally and socially significant
cases, the limits of the school speech cases powerfully illustrate the
limits of even landmark Supreme Court decisions; each had less impact,
on the law and on the parties, than is commonly understood.
Section II.A details how each case had a more modest impact on the
state of the law than the prevailing narrative conveys. Subsection II.A.1
notes that because civil rights cases are unprofitable to litigate, Tinker
never had the real-world impact that it had on the cold legal doctrine:
censorship remained widespread and speech lawsuits remained rare.
Subsection II.A.2 details that the opposite is true as well: schools’ three
post-Tinker victories were idiosyncratically fact-dependent wins that
never gutted Tinker to the extent often depicted. Tinker never stopped
emboldening students and never stopped yielding a notable record of
lower court speech rights victories—contrary to the view of Fraser,
Kuhlmeier, and Morse as the three-pronged end of student rights.
Section II.B then goes beyond the legal impact of each case to
examine its human impact, finding an even more intriguing way the
school speech cases show the limits of Supreme Court decisions: each
Court decision had a quite limited impact on the student litigants
themselves. Interviews with various student plaintiffs and their
191. Id. at 407 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995)).
192. Id. at 408.
193. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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attorneys, as well as contemporary media coverage, show that whether
each student felt vindicated bears remarkably little relationship to
whether each actually won or lost at the Supreme Court. Some of those
who lost, or never reached a verdict, feel the most like winners, to this
day.
A. The Limited Impact of the Court Decisions: Tinker’s Lack of
Enforceability and the Later Cases Leaving Tinker Alive, Yielding
Mixed Rulings and Legal Ambiguity
Tinker was a bombshell; it vastly changed school speech law,194 and
scholars still study it and debate its meaning.195 Post-Morse, debate has
raged among the lower courts because the impact of Morse is clearly
substantial, but unclear in scope. Without fully examining each question
Morse raises, this Section surveys several major debates on Morse’s
meaning, Tinker’s remaining vitality, and new speech controversies yet
to be addressed.
1. Tinker’s Limited Enforceability, Leaving Schools Largely Free to
Censor
Violations of student speech rights tend to go unlitigated. To
litigators, “some types of civil rights litigation [are] less attractive than
other types”196—and student speech cases fall squarely into the “less
attractive” category. Damages for speech rights violations typically are
modest because compensatory damages for any civil rights violation
require proof of specific injury with admissible evidence;197 courts will
not presume damages from the mere fact of the violation.198 Even where
evidence establishes emotional or otherwise subjective injury, courts
tend to limit damages for civil rights violations to four or five figures,199
194. See, e.g., Richard L. Berkman, Students in Court: Free Speech and the Functions of
Schooling in America, 40 HARV. EDUC. REV. 567, 568–69, 580 (1970) (calling Tinker a “notable
departure from th[e] tradition of judicial timidity” that adopted a view of “education different
from that traditionally expressed by American courts[,]” and that offered “none of the familiar
rhetoric about the disciplinary purposes of education”).
195. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 14.
196. Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990’s: The Dichotomy Between
Reality and Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197, 199 (1997).
197. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978).
198. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310–11 (1986).
199. See, e.g., Delph v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. of Paragould, Inc., 130 F.3d 349, 357–58
(8th Cir. 1997) (reducing plaintiff’s award from $150,000 to $50,000 on evidence of emotional
harm plus headaches, ulcers, and withdrawal from his wife as a result of discrimination);
Farpella-Crosby v. Horizon Health Care, 97 F.3d 803, 804–05, 809 (5th Cir. 1996) (upholding
$7,500 award on for sexual harassment in the form of numerous comments on plaintiff’s sexual
activities and personal life, where plaintiff (with corroboration from co-worker) testified that she
felt stressed, embarrassed, belittled, disgusted, hopeless, and stupid); McKinnon v. Kwong Wah
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unless the plaintiff can present particularized evidence of significant
emotional consequences, such as clinical depression shown by solid
evidence, whether through a medical diagnosis or extensive lay witness
corroboration.200
The only other monetary relief is the attorney’s fee award to the
plaintiff’s attorney, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), but various judicial
decisions have diminished the size and certainty of such an award:
decisions “permitting waivers of attorneys’ fees as a condition of
settlement”;201 decisions “eliminat[ing] contingent risk enhancement of
fees”;202 and decisions denying a fee award when a plaintiff wins a prejudgment settlement (rather than an actual verdict) providing much or
even all of the relief sought.203 In a review of case law combined with
interviews of plaintiffs’ civil rights attorneys, Julie Davies documented
how limiting damages and fee awards “leads to undercompensation of
plaintiffs’ attorneys, and produces disincentives to represent plaintiffs in
cases that lack ‘personal injury’-type damages”204—such as student
speech claims.
The fizzle of the Tinker case itself, the very case that raised the
promise of student speech lawsuits, shows how even a successful claim
Rest., 83 F.3d 498, 501, 506 (1st Cir. 1996) (affirming $2,500 in damages for similar claim);
Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211, 1215–16 (6th Cir. 1996) (upholding award of
$50,000 for plaintiff terminated for contemplating an abortion, when witnesses testified plaintiff
was upset and frightened after termination, and where plaintiff testified she suffered nightmares,
weight loss during pregnancy, and nervousness: “plaintiffs can prove emotional injury by
testimony without medical support. However, damages for mental and emotional distress will
not be presumed, and must be proven by ‘competent evidence’” (citations omitted)); Cowan v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 852 F.2d 688, 690–91 (2d Cir. 1988) (awarding only $15,000 for
race discrimination where plaintiff claiming emotional distress and humiliation but neither faced
public humiliation nor sought counseling); Ramsey v. Am. Air Filter Co., 772 F.2d 1303, 1313
(7th Cir. 1985) (reducing race discrimination damages award from $75,000 to $35,000, despite
evidence of mental anguish and humiliation, because no medical evidence showed treatment for
depression or emotional distress).
200. Salinas v. O’Neill, 286 F.3d 827, 830, 832–33 (5th Cir. 2002) (allowing $150,000
award but reducing it from $300,000 when evidence showed plaintiff suffered high levels of
paranoia about further retaliation by superiors, deteriorating relations with his family, and
numerous physician visits); Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1065 (8th Cir. 1997)
(upholding $100,000 award on claim of discriminatory denial of promotion and retaliation:
where “[plaintiff], his wife and his son testified about the anxiety, sleeplessness, stress,
depression, high blood pressure, headaches, and humiliation he suffered[,] . . . medical or other
expert evidence was not required to prove emotional distress”).
201. Davies, supra note 196, at 198 (citing Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986) (allowing
waivers of statutorily provided attorney’s fees in settlements)).
202. Id. (citing City of Burlington v. Dague, 502 U.S. 107 (1992) (curtailing judicial
discretion to award fee enhancements)).
203. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532
U.S. 598, 605–06 (2001).
204. Davies, supra note 196, at 200.
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may reap little monetary reward—and even get dropped before a
verdict. The Tinker Supreme Court decision just revived the dismissed
claim, remanding it for further proceedings. Decades later, the ACLU
attorney on the case did not remember whether any further proceedings
occurred,205 perhaps illustrating the limits of the ACLU’s ability to
represent students with speech cases. But the students’ local Iowa
counsel, Dan Johnston, did remember: “[t]here were no proceedings
after the S[upreme] C[our]t decision,” because by then the school
ceased banning armbands, and the students had graduated.206 With little
left for which to sue, Johnston explained, they were “not particularly
interested”207 in continuing the case for relief they did not actually need.
With student speech rights claims unprofitable for lawyers to litigate,
there is essentially no private bar of school speech lawyers. Claims do
get litigated by pro bono lawyers, by functionally pro bono attorneys
who accept a fee award but fully expect to litigate at a loss, and by
attorneys at nonprofit entities like the ACLU and the Student Press Law
Center (SPLC), the sole legal organization focused on student speech
rights. Tellingly, the SPLC “gets several thousand complaints a year
about censorship at high school [news]papers[,]” and its Executive
Director, Frank D. LoMonte, believes that “[t]he vast majority of
complaints are well-founded . . . . It’s a pretty big step for a 16-year-old
to call a lawyer and when they call it normally checks out.”208 But even
those thousands of complaints likely are just the tip of the iceberg
because “our experience is that the vast majority of high school students
are too scared to complain and don’t understand that they have rights,”
LoMonte elaborates; “if we take 1,000 complaints a year of censorship,
the real number must be 10 times that.”209
2. The Post-Tinker Court Decisions Leaving Tinker Alive and the Law
Muddled: How Major Decisions Yield Less Change than Expected
To illustrate how Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse did not truly
eviscerate Tinker, this Subsection notes key ways that, even following
Morse, interpretations vary widely on various fundamental issues of
student speech rights: the extent to which schools are specially speechrestricted institutions, a point on which Morse substantially disagreed
with Tinker; the continued vitality of the Tinker requirement of
205. E-mail from Melvin Wolf, Former ACLU Legal Director, to Scott A. Moss (June 29,
2010) (on file with author).
206. Interview with Dan Johnston (Aug. 6, 2010) (on file with author).
207. Id.
208. Tony Rogers, Faculty Advisers Increasingly Face the Ax for Not Censoring High
School Papers, ABOUT.COM, http://journalism.about.com/od/schoolsinternships/a/student
censorship.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
209. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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viewpoint-neutrality in speech restrictions, a requirement Morse
arguably undercut; whether students’ online speech is “school” speech
such that schools can restrict it—a matter of growing lower court
controversy that the Supreme Court has not yet addressed; and the
extent to which student speech rights, once uniformly asserted by leftleaning teenagers against schools enforcing traditional values and
discipline, will prove powerful for the new generation of younger
conservative activists.
These unsettled issues the Tinker-to-Morse evolution raises are
merely examples of an important broader point about how to view
major Supreme Court decisions: when the Court issues what appears to
be a major decision, commentators should be wary of declaring it a
high-impact precedent sweepingly reshaping the legal landscape.
Decisions that at first blush appear transformative may prove to leave
open a range of key issues, illustrating the limits of even those Supreme
Court decisions that appear to substantially alter existing legal
principles.
a. Is School a Specially Speech-Restricted Institution?
Should speech be more limited in schools? Many think so. Professor
Frederick Schauer criticizes the “presumption” that rights “do not vary
substantially with institutional setting”:210 ”[H]aving created the test for
obscenity in the context of sales of printed materials by mail, the
Court . . . appl[ies] the same line . . . to outdoor theaters, to dial-a-porn
telephone services, to cable and satellite television, and to the
Internet . . . .”211 The Court is “institutionally oblivious”212 in treating
all speech the same, Schauer contends, “distort[ing] doctrine and
underprotect[ing]” speech: “A Court that . . . must apply the
same . . . grounds of offensive content to both broadcast television and
Bob’s XXX Adult Bookstore and Peepshow is, in reality, much more
likely to allow less for Bob than it is to permit virtually everything for
CBS during prime time[.]”213
Along these lines, Professor Paul Horwitz defends the speech
choices of “First Amendment institutions,” such as schools, libraries,
and the press,214 and Professor Joseph Blocher thinks a robust
“marketplace of ideas” justifies schools’ judgments that “academic
210. Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV.
1256, 1263 (2005).
211. Id. at 1261–62 (footnotes omitted).
212. Id. at 1264.
213. Id. at 1272–73.
214. Paul Horwitz, Grutter’s First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461, 589 (2005); see also
Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers and Hard
Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497 (2007).
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principles bar the presence of certain speakers.”215
Others criticize such deference, including Justice Robert Jackson in
an early school case: “We cannot, because of modest estimates of our
competence in such specialties as public education, withhold the
judgment . . . of this Court when liberty is infringed.”216 More recently,
scholars such as Dean Erwin Chemerinsky argue that constitutional
rights “apply least where they are needed the most” because of the
Court’s “great deference to institutions . . . such as prisons, the military,
[and] schools,” where individuals “have little, if any, protection.”217
Agreeing with Chemerinsky, I have argued that “[b]y dividing speech
rights so starkly by institutional context, courts have not just
recognized, but . . . overstated, the uniqueness of schools, workplaces,
and prisons.”218 Of course, many on both sides might accept nuanced
views like Blocher’s: schools can restrict speech, “[b]ut in keeping with
academia’s marketplace-of-ideas-enhancing mission, these restrictions
must . . . ultimately improve the market,” not enforce orthodoxy.219 And
deference to schools pales in comparison to deference to prisons, where
speech rights are far more diminished.220
This debate is not just academic. While speech in public by fringe
radicals dominated the early case law,221 cases since address schools,
prisons,222 prosecutor’s offices,223 and websites.224
Tinker rejected deference; requiring “substantial disruption” to
restrict speech,225 it paralleled Brandenburg’s requiring imminent,
likely harm.226 True, Tinker omitted Brandenburg’s rule that restricted
speech must be intended (“directed”) to produce harm.227 But Tinker did
not aim to lower speech rights in schools: it famously declared
215. Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 863
(2008).
216. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639–40 (1943).
217. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 441, 441 (1999).
218. Scott A. Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners—Oh, My! A Cautionary Note
About Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1635,
1640 (2007).
219. Blocher, supra note 215, at 869.
220. Aaron H. Caplan, Freedom of Speech in School and Prison, 85 WASH. L. REV. 71, 80–
90 (2010) (documenting different judicial scrutiny); Moss, supra note 218, at 1641–42 (same).
221. E.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(discussing “a silly leaflet by an unknown man”); Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,
93 (1972) (“[B]y himself, Mosley would walk the public sidewalk . . . carrying a sign[.]”).
222. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81 (1987).
223. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006).
224. See infra Subsection II.A.2.c.
225. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511, 514 (1969).
226. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
227. Id.
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traditional speech rights within “the schoolhouse gate”; it railed against
schools becoming “enclaves of totalitarianism”;228 and it closely
scrutinized evidence of harm. Thus “Tinker [was] the ‘inside’ speech
correlate to the ‘outside’ speech principle of Brandenburg[.]”229
Despite Tinker, “later school speech cases—all of which have upheld
restrictions . . . —have demonstrated an increasing institutional
awareness.”230 Citing Fraser and Kuhlmeier, Morse held that “rights of
students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the
rights of adults in other settings”231 and that “schools may regulate some
speech ‘even though the government could not censor similar speech
outside[.]’”232 Yet Fraser and Kuhlmeier turned heavily on the schools’
role in publishing the speech; Morse held that “Kuhlmeier does not
control . . . because no one would reasonably believe that Frederick’s
banner bore the school’s imprimatur.”233 Morse thus was the first nonschool-sponsorship case declaring school a speech-restricted institution;
it paralleled the Tinker district court’s deferential declaration that
“[u]nless the actions of school officials . . . are unreasonable, the Courts
should not interfere.”234
Morse sided with the institutionalists, but to what extent? The scope
of school power remains unclear in various respects, including two
surveyed below: schools declaring certain viewpoints off-limits and
students’ online speech.
b. Whither Viewpoint Neutrality: To What Extent Can Schools “Take
Sides,” at Least on Cases Implicating Safety Concerns?
The Tinker armband ban was viewpoint-discriminatory; principals
focused their crackdown on antiwar speech in particular, and they left
other controversial symbolic speech untouched. Fraser and Kuhlmeier
excluded particular content—sexual imagery (Fraser) and intimate
family details (Kuhlmeier)—but did not address discrimination by
viewpoint; the Kuhlmeier principal excluded by content (private family
and sexual matters) but not by viewpoint within that content (such as by
228. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506, 511.
229. Jamin B. Raskin, No Enclaves of Totalitarianism: The Triumph and Unrealized
Promise of the Tinker Decision, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1193, 1195 (2009); Schauer, supra note 210,
at 1263 (reading Tinker as reaffirming that speech rights do not vary substantially by
institution). But see Steven Penaro, Reconciling Morse with Brandenburg, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
251, 252 (2008) (“Brandenburg has never been used . . . [for] school speech.”).
230. Blocher, supra note 215, at 873.
231. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404–05 (2007) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
232. Id. at 405–06 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988)).
233. Id. at 405.
234. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 972 (S.D. Iowa
1966).
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excluding an article sympathetic to teen mothers while still publishing
another taking a critical view).
Morse newly allowed punishment “squarely and explicitly based on
viewpoint,” Professor Douglas Laycock observes: “The school claimed
power to punish speech it disagreed with . . . because [the] banner
‘expressed a positive sentiment about marijuana[.]’”235 It allowed
viewpoint discrimination even for speech “not bear[ing] the school’s
imprimatur,” Professor Emily Gold Waldman further notes.236 More
colorfully, Professor Clay Calvert blasts the broader readings of the
authority Morse granted schools as “a judicial joyride down a slippery
slope of censorship[.]”237
Several academics, though, read Morse narrowly and would still
disallow schools from restricting particular ideas. Blocher calls the
decision “quite narrow” because it “[i]nvok[ed] the importance of
student safety” to justify restricting “speech that reasonably appears to
encourage illegal drug use,” without touching more issue-oriented
speech such as “advocating decriminalization, or opposing the war on
drugs, or any other social or political commentary.”238 Laycock
similarly warns against reading Morse as permitting all viewpoint
discrimination: “this is a dangerous doctrine, requiring careful
definition. Schools no doubt have broader power . . . to suppress
viewpoints. . . . [T]here are some ideas on which the school can
suppress dissent. But there cannot be many.”239 Arguably Morse itself
rejects broad discrimination, rebuffing arguments for restricting any
“offensive” speech as “stretch[ing] Fraser too far” because “much
political and religious speech . . . [is] offensive to some.”240 Concurring,
Justice Samuel Alito warned that Morse “provides no support” for
restricting speech “on any political or social issue”241 and that
restrictions must “be based on some special characteristic of the school
setting”;242 Alito’s concurrence drew the fourth and fifth votes on the
235. Douglas Laycock, High-Value Speech and the Basic Educational Mission of a Public
School: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 111, 116 (2008).
236. Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood’s Core: A New Approach to
Restrictions on School-Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63, 111 (2008).
237. Clay Calvert, Misuse and Abuse of Morse v. Frederick by Lower Courts: Stretching
the High Court’s Ruling Too Far to Censor Student Expression, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 5
(2008).
238. Joseph Blocher, School Naming Rights and the First Amendment’s Perfect Storm, 96
GEO. L.J. 1, 47 (2007) (“The actual holding of the case was quite narrow. Invoking the
importance of student safety, it upheld schools’ power to limit speech that reasonably appears to
encourage illegal drug use, as opposed to advocating decriminalization, or opposing the war on
drugs, or any other social or political commentary.”).
239. Laycock, supra note 235, at 116, 120.
240. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409 (2007).
241. Id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring).
242. Id. at 424.
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Court, so some circuits view it as controlling,243 but others do not.244
Paralleling Alito’s cautionary note, Professor John E. Taylor argues for
allowing viewpoint discrimination only where schools act not to
suppress views, but in “narrowly tailored” efforts to prevent harms
specific to speech with that viewpoint.245 Waldman suggests another
limit on viewpoint discrimination: “the stronger the perception of school
imprimatur” over speech, “the more latitude . . . [for] viewpoint-based
restrictions”;246 the banner lacked official backing but arguably
reflected on the school that authorized the across-the-street outing.
Several lower courts have rejected the notion that Morse authorizes
broad viewpoint discrimination, instead viewing schools’ post-Morse
powers as extending only to speech advocating illegal drugs,
threatening serious violence, or otherwise posing the “substantial
disruption” risk that Tinker required. Ponce v. Socorro Independent
School District viewed Morse as narrowly “focused on the particular
harm to students of speech advocating drug use” or other similarly
weighty illegality; “speech advocating a harm that is demonstrably
grave . . . to the physical safety of students . . . is unprotected.”247 Ponce
ultimately allowed punishment of the student, but the extremity of the
speech—a high school student’s threatening diary—made the case no
real defeat for student rights:
[The] notebook diary . . . detailed the “author’s” creation of
a pseudo-Nazi [student] group[,] . . . [incidents] in which
the author ordered his group “to brutally injure two
homosexuals and seven colored” people and another in
which the author describes punishing another student by
setting his house on fire and “brutally murder[ing]” his
dog. . . . [It] details the group’s plan to commit a
“[C]olumbine shooting” attack on Montwood High . . . . At
several points . . . , the author expresses the feeling that his
“anger has the best of [him]” and that “it will get to the
point where [he] will no longer have control” . . . [and] that
this outburst will occur on the day that his close friends at

243. See, e.g., Palmer v. Waxahachie Indep. Sch. Dist., 579 F.3d 502, 508 n.8 (5th Cir.
2009) (“Alito’s concurrence is ‘controlling[.]’”); Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 564 (6th Cir.
2008) (referencing Alito’s concurrence in its discussion of the Morse holding).
244. See Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist., 523 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that
Alito’s concurrence is not controlling).
245. John E. Taylor, Tinker and Viewpoint Discrimination, 77 UMKC L. REV. 569, 578–79
(2009).
246. Waldman, supra note 236, at 112.
247. Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 769–70 (5th Cir. 2007).
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the school graduate.248
However, Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Central School District249 held
that even for speech advocating serious illegality, and thus falling
within even a narrow definition of Morse, schools must still satisfy the
Tinker “material and substantial disruption” test. The student in Cuff
“was suspended for six days after submitting an alleged threat of
violence to his teacher during an in-class assignment”250—specifically,
he wrote “‘blow up the school with all the teachers in it.’”251 The
district court dismissed the student’s lawsuit challenging his suspension,
deeming such a threat unprotected as a matter of law.252 But the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, finding plausible a
claim that punishment of the speech was improper because no real
threat existed: the student was ten years old, with no “history that would
suggest a violent tendency,”253 and his supposed threat came when his
teacher “asked her students to fill in a picture of an astronaut with
statements about their personalities,”254 and in response, the student—
“in crayon”255—“listed his birthday, his teacher’s name, and his favorite
sports,” in addition to his troubling “blow up” non sequitur.256
In short, the cases reading Morse narrowly still require the Tinker
showing that the advocacy of illegality poses a real threat; to be
punishable, the threat must be more like the Ponce high schooler’s
private diary detailing a credible plan for a shooting massacre, and less
like the Cuff ten-year-old’s crayon-scribbled free association of favorite
sports, his birthday, and “blow up the school.” But Morse itself shows
the line is blurry: it is not clear that Joe Frederick’s absurdist banner
threatened to produce the illegality it arguably advocated (“BONG
HiTS”) much more meaningfully than the Cuff child’s “blow up the
school” writing. True, a ten-year-old probably lacked bomb-making or
bomb-procurement abilities, so no harm was imminent; at most, the
school could have thought that the statement showed the child was
disturbed enough to pose a risk of future harm. But with no evidence
Frederick himself was taking or dealing drugs, neither was his banner
248. Id. at 766. Ponce’s loss seemed preordained once the first sentence of the court’s
opinion declared, “This appeal presents the question of whether student speech that threatens a
Columbine-style attack on a school is protected by the First Amendment.” Id.
249. 341 F. App’x 692 (2d Cir. 2009).
250. Id. at 693.
251. Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 559 F. Supp. 2d 415, 417 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
252. Id. at 419–22.
253. Cuff, 341 F. App’x at 693.
254. Cuff, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 417.
255. Cuff, 341 F. App’x at 693.
256. Cuff, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 417.
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likely to induce imminent illegality.
Contrary to the cases deeming Morse to authorize only drugs-andviolence crackdowns, other cases allow schools to target views
threatening a broader array of harms than actual illegality. For example,
Harper v. Poway Unified School District interpreted Morse as
sweepingly allowing speech restrictions “to protect students . . . from
degrading acts or expressions that promote injury to the student’s
physical, emotional or psychological well-being and development.”257
Harper ruled against a student punished for violating a school “hate
behavior” policy with a religiously antihomosexuality t-shirt stating,
“Homosexuality is shameful. . . . Our school has embraced what God
has condemned.”258 Barr v. Lafon259 similarly allowed a ban on
confederate flags, but only upon a Tinker “substantial disruption”
analysis,260 and upon declaring Morse “a narrow holding: a public
school may prohibit student speech at school or at a school-sponsored
event during school hours that the school ‘reasonably view[s] as
promoting illegal drug use.’”261 With the cases all over the map on
when schools can target only certain viewpoints, the impact of Morse
“on questions not involving illegal[lity] . . . remains to be seen.”262
c. Is Online Speech “School Speech” at All?
Morse broadly defined what is sufficiently “school speech” to face
restriction. But Morse’s setting—a banner at a public event—resembled
twentieth century protest controversies more than the increasingly
typical twenty-first century controversy: online speech. Are students’
school-related online postings from home punishable?
In two post-Morse cases, the Second Circuit let schools punish
student online speech; in two surprising twists, it applied the Tinker
“substantial disruption” test, but tweaked the test to be more schooldeferential under Morse. In Wisniewski v. Board of Education,263 a
student’s instant messenger icon read, “Kill Mr. VanderMolen”—an
English teacher—and depicted “a pistol firing a bullet at a person’s
head . . . [with] dots representing splattered blood.”264 In Doninger v.

257. 545 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1101 (S.D. Cal. 2007), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 318 F.
App’x 540 (9th Cir. 2009) (vacating injunctive claims as moot; otherwise affirming judgment
for defendants).
258. Harper, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 1075, 1081 (internal quotation marks omitted).
259. 538 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2008).
260. Id. at 565–66 (undertaking Tinker “substantial disruption” analysis).
261. Id. at 564 (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409 (2007)).
262. Taylor, supra note 245, at 586 n.80.
263. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir.
2007).
264. Id. at 36.
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Niehoff,265 a student blog complained that a school activity was
cancelled by “douchebags in central office,” and urged student
complaints to “piss [the superintendent] off more.”266 Surprisingly,
given that Morse freed courts from always having to apply Tinker’s
“substantial disruption” test, Wisniewski declared Tinker “the
appropriate First Amendment standard.”267 Yet both Second Circuit
cases thought the speech threatened “foreseeable risk . . . [of]
‘materially and substantially disrupt[ing] the [school’s] work and
discipline.’”268
Yet where Tinker closely scrutinized disruption evidence, these postMorse decisions defer to schools on likelihood of disruption.
Wisniewski declared, “the icon, once made known to the teacher
and . . . officials, would foreseeably create a risk of substantial
disruption”—but the Court offered no explanation and no evidence of
that risk.269 It said only that the image “distressed” the teacher, but a
psychological exam found the student “had no violent intent, posed no
actual threat, and made the icon as a joke.”270 Doninger asserted that
calling officials “douchebags” and urging complaints about an event
threatened substantial disruption because “students were ‘all riled up’
and . . . a sit-in was threatened.”271 But the First Amendment typically
does not allow punishing speakers for calling officials names and
criticizing their decisions just because listeners may commit illegality
that the speaker never urged; officials’ duty “is to restrain the mob” and
“preserve the opportunity of an individual to speak.”272
The Second Circuit muddied the waters further by considering a
factor courts typically do not apply: the magnitude of punishment. The
Doninger court said it had “no occasion to consider whether a different,
more serious consequence than disqualification from student office
would raise constitutional concerns.”273 Deeming speech protected
against some punishments but not others is a novel idea that, if applied
broadly, would substantially alter much speech law.
265. 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).
266. Id. at 45.
267. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38; see also Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50 (declining to decide
whether Fraser or other precedent applies because the school, “as in Wisniewski,” satisfied
Tinker).
268. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38–39 (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403
(2007)).
269. Id. at 40.
270. Id. at 36.
271. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 51.
272. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1416–17
(1986) (citing Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 327 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting) (dissenting
from the ruling that the crowd’s angry response justified the speaker’s arrest)).
273. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 53.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011

37

Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 6 [2011], Art. 3

1444

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

The Third Circuit applied a similar standard but held online speech
protected in Layshock v. Hermitage School District.274 Layshock posted
a fake MySpace profile of his principal, calling him a marijuana user, a
keg thief, a member of “Steroids International,” a “big whore,” and a
“big fag”; this inspired other offensive copycats.275 Though students
accessed the page not only from home but also from school computers,
the court would “not allow the School District to stretch its authority so
far that it reaches . . . [students’] home[s].”276 Finding insufficient
evidence of disruption under Tinker, or school sponsorship under
Morse, Layshock viewed Morse as a slight expansion of controllable
“school sponsored” speech, encompassing any “school sponsored
event.”277 Absent sponsorship, Tinker requires real evidence of
disruption, leaving the speech protected even though it was more
offensive than Doninger’s “douchebag.”
Evans v. Bayer similarly deemed protected a student’s Facebook
group, “Ms. Sarah Phelps is the worst teacher I’ve ever met”: “To those
select students who have had the displeasure of having Ms. Sarah
Phelps, or simply knowing her and her insane antics: Here is the place
to express your feelings of hatred.”278 Calling a teacher “insane” and
declaring “hatred” outstrips “douchebag,” but Evans protected the
speech “made off-campus, never accessed on-campus, and . . . no longer
accessible” when the school found it.279 Citing Tinker, Evans held “key”
whether officials had “a well-founded belief that a ‘substantial’
disruption will occur.”280 While Morse restricted “speech at off-campus,
school sponsored activities,”281 Evans reasoned that applying Morse “to
the entire internet . . . [is] too far reaching.”282 This fear parallels
Professor Sonja West’s concern that Morse “could encourage
school[s] . . . to sanction all sorts of off-campus community events,
thereby aggrandizing government power” over students’ speech.283
d. The Ideological Flip: How Powerful Will Speech Rights Prove for
Conservative Causes?
Cases from Tinker to Morse pitted liberal or norm-challenging
274. 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010).
275. Id. at 252–53.
276. Id. at 260.
277. Id. at 251.
278. Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
279. Id. at 1372.
280. Id. at 1373.
281. Id. at 1370.
282. Id. at 1374.
283. Sonja R. West, Sanctionable Conduct: How the Supreme Court Stealthily Opened the
Schoolhouse Gate, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 27, 29 (2008).
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students against officials protecting traditional morality and education.
Today, the ideological waters of speech rights and speech restrictions
are muddier, thanks to the rise of both conservative activism and online
speech that the left, rather than the right, aims to restrict.
Student activists in the 1960s typically were antiwar liberals, but
student activists citing Tinker now include pro-war conservatives, as in
Bowler v. Town of Hudson.284 Bowler concerned a conservative poster
at Hudson High School (HHS), in the small town of Hudson,
Massachusetts, which “became the subject of some notoriety, both
locally and nationally.”285 Christopher Bowler and other conservative
students “believed that faculty, administration, and fellow
students . . . were prejudiced against conservative political views, and
that the school lacked a forum for . . . their beliefs”;286 he thought
“teachers often only presented a left-leaning viewpoint when tackling
issues such as the Iraq war.”287 They formed the “Conservative Club” as
“a venue for ‘pro-American, pro-conservative dialogue and speech.’”288
HHS Principal Stapelfeld told Bowler “he was glad they were ‘getting
involved politically,’ and helped the Club find an advisor.”289 But
Bowler perceived hostility: “teachers telling the club advisor . . . he
would ‘spread hate around the school, promote violence, be antigay;’”290 then HHS taking down Club posters. The posters listed the
website address of the “High School Conservative Clubs of America,”
which linked to another site “hosting graphic video footage of hostage
beheadings in Iraq and Afghanistan.”291 The site displayed “a prominent
banner entitled ‘Islam: A Religion of Peace?’ . . . [with] a picture of a
blindfolded hostage kneeling in front of three masked and armed
terrorists . . . [and]
realtime
videos
of
beheadings
linked
underneath . . . with a warning that the ‘following videos are extreme
[sic] graphic.’”292 “[A]ll recognized student clubs” put up posters,293 but
the school disallowed Bowler’s because of the links to video of “hooded
executioners; the sounds of the victim as he was killed; . . . blood [and]
close-up images of the fatal wound, the severed head and the lifeless
284. 514 F. Supp. 2d 168 (D. Mass. 2007).
285. Id. at 174. E.g., John Dyer, Lawsuit Trial Date, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 27, 2007; Jennifer
Rosinski, Hudson Asks Judge to Dismiss Student’s Lawsuit, BOS. GLOBE, June 21, 2007; Peter
Schworm, Conservative Teens Say School is Biased, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 10, 2005.
286. Bowler, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 172.
287. Dan McDonald, Debate Continues after Judge Rules against Hudson High,
METROWEST DAILY NEWS, Oct. 7, 2007.
288. Bowler, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 172.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 173.
291. Id. at 171, 172.
292. Id. at 173. The website, www.hscca.org, is now defunct.
293. Id.
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body.”294 Bowler countered that HHS discriminated in restricting
violent footage, having “shown the films Fahrenheit 9/11 and
Schindler’s List, both of which show graphic violence.”295 Bowler
thought the real reason for the poster removal was “to censor . . . [its]
political views”296 and retaliate against Bowler for posting on the Club
website “articles critical of . . . a liberal bias that had permeated the
school’s curriculum.”297
Bowler denied the school summary judgment but not just by
deeming trial factfinding necessary; it paralleled Tinker in repeatedly
using the charged word “censorship” to describe the poster removal—
and in rejecting the school’s arguments. “Fear of disruption” was
insufficient because “under Tinker, school officials must produce some
evidence that a restriction ‘is necessary to avoid material or substantial
interference with schoolwork or discipline.’”298 Disruption is a
“narrow” ground for restriction, and the school presented little evidence,
so “[t]he risk that student counseling may be required, or the likelihood
of unplanned classroom discussions, does not rise to the level of a
substantial and material disruption comprehended by Tinker.”299 Neither
did Fraser support deeming the posters “plainly offensive”: someone
viewing the videos had to “access the website[,] . . . navigate past an
express warning, and . . . affirmatively click on a link to the videos.”300
Students thus “were not a ‘captive audience,’” distinguishing Fraser;301
and “[w]hen students are exposed to speech only . . . [by] voluntary
choice, the speaker has not invaded the rights of others,” distinguishing
Tinker’s rights-of-others basis for restriction.302 And Morse supported
restricting only pro-drug speech, Bowler held. Though just a district
court case, Bowler illustrates how schools’ three post-Tinker Supreme
Court victories leave intact the Tinker holding that schools cannot
discriminate against antiwar speech—or, here, pro-war speech by
Christopher Bowler, who is both war protester John Tinker’s heir and
his ideological opposite.303
More broadly, since the Tinker-to-Hazelwood era, there has been a
294. Id.
295. Id. at 175.
296. Id. at 172.
297. McDonald, supra note 287.
298. Bowler, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 178 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)).
299. Id. at 178.
300. Id. at 177–78 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
301. Id. at 178 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684).
302. Id.
303. Id. at 176–77 (reaffirming the rule against viewpoint discrimination and interpreting
Morse as limited to pro-drug speech).
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new crop of conservative activists pressing not only their rights to
political advocacy (as in Bowler) but also their rights to religious,
usually Christian, public expression. Illustrating how student speech
rights can overlap with the goal of allowing more religious expression
in governmental settings, student speech rights, once the province of
hippies and rebels, have found a powerful advocate in Jay Sekulow,
chief counsel for the American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ), who
has argued at the Supreme Court for school prayer,304 religious displays
on public lands,305 and public scholarship availability for theology
students.306 In a law review article that begins with a ringing quote from
Tinker, Sekulow argues “for broad First Amendment protection for
‘controversial’ religious and pro-life student expression,” on the
premise that “[t]he vast majority of religious and pro-life clothing is no
more likely to create an actual disturbance that substantially disrupts
school functions than a peace armband worn during Vietnam.”307
Thus, whereas the prior generation of values-focused conservatives
pressed for more school authority to restrict impertinent student speech,
Sekulow goes as far as “encouraging lower courts to follow the
reasoning of the more speech-protective cases whenever possible.”308
Sekulow’s Christian conservative argument for broad student speech
rights may ring true with the new crop of young conservative political
and religious activists, but it shows how behind the times the
conservative school speech advocacy at the Supreme Court has been.
Morse school attorney Kenneth Starr blasts Tinker for having “departed
from the traditional” view of schools as sources of “order, civility, and
the inculcation of virtue”;309 Justice Clarence Thomas similarly wrote in
Morse that the First Amendment should “not protect student speech in
public schools” at all, because schools exist to “instill[] ‘a core of
common values’ in students and [teach] them self-control.”310
Conservative activists are not the only ones who have changed since
the Tinker-to-Hazelwood era; liberal perspectives on harmful speech
have also substantially shifted. In contrast to the free speech
fundamentalism of the 1960s, today’s left presses for restrictions on,
among other speech, “cyberbullying”—that is, online ridicule and
insulting of classmates. While most cyberbullying originates on home
304. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000).
305. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
306. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715 (2004).
307. Jay Alan Sekulow & Erik M. Zimmerman, Tinker at Forty: Defending the Right of
High School Students to Wear “Controversial” Religious and Pro-Life Clothing, 58 AM. U. L.
REV. 1243, 1245 (2009).
308. Id. at 1246.
309. Starr, supra note 13, at 662.
310. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410, 411 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011

41

Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 6 [2011], Art. 3

1448

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

computers, effects are “felt every day within the schoolhouse”311—the
sort of outside speech with inside effects with which courts struggle.
Restrictions on cyberbullying respond to calls by Professor Danielle
Keats Citron and others for “cyber civil rights” efforts against online
harassment: “On social networking sites [and] blogs, . . . groups publish
lies and doctored photographs of vulnerable individuals. They threaten
rape and . . . violence . . . overwhelmingly target[ing] . . . women[,] . . .
people of color, religious minorities, gays, and lesbians. . . . [C]yber
civil rights advocates must overcome the free speech argument asserted
by online abusers.”312
In short, most mid-twentieth century cases were law-and-order
crackdowns on liberals and radicals, but since the late twentieth century,
many equality-promoting and offense-avoiding speech restrictions draw
liberal support and conservative opposition: liability for discriminatory
harassment;313 hate crime penalties;314 and corporate political speech
limits.315 Professor Jack Balkin makes this point colorfully with a
tongue-in-cheek quiz:
What do the Klan, conservative PACs, R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco, and the conglomerate that owns the holding
company that owns the manufacturer of your favorite brand
of toothpaste all have in common? They can all justify their
activities in the name of the first amendment. What was
sauce for the liberal goose increasingly has become sauce
for the more conservative gander.316
Given the recognized ideological indeterminacy of speech rights—
protecting not only left against right, but also right against left—it is
odd that, at the Supreme Court, the school speech battle lines have
remained so ideologically drawn: edgy liberal speech against moralistic
restrictions pressed by conservative legal establishment figures from
Kenneth Starr317 to Clarence Thomas.318 In this light, Morse was an
anachronism, an old-style case of a student who was half Tinker-style
1960s rebel, half Fraser-style 1980s smart-aleck. Cases of pro-war and
evangelical Christian activists, already beginning to filter through the
311. Todd D. Erb, A Case for Strengthening School District Jurisdiction to Punish OffCampus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257, 258 (2008).
312. Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 64–67 (2009).
313. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791 (1992) (criticizing such liability).
314. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
315. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
316. J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 384.
317. See supra text accompanying note 309.
318. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
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lower courts but not yet the subject of any Supreme Court decision, may
change the ideological lines of the entire debate.
B. The Limited Impact of the Supreme Court Rulings on the Parties’
Lives and Causes: What Did the Cases Mean to Each Student Speech
Plaintiff?
Set aside what these cases meant for the law; what did they mean for
the plaintiffs, the real people claiming constitutional injuries? The
school speech plaintiffs were so young compared to most litigants;
looking back, do they stand by their actions, or do they view their
speech—antiwar, sexually explicit, drug-related—as youthful idealism
or petulance? Or is it that maybe some of the speech was never really
about the students?
The Tinker school district argued that the parental involvement
betrayed that counterculture pacifists like Reverend Tinker were just
“infiltrat[ing]” schools with “propaganda.”319 The students responded
that they acted on their own “personal concern about the war” even if
that concern “reflected the religious, ethical and moral environment in
which they were raised.”320 But children’s political views notoriously
evolve as they age; do lawsuits really offer students vindication, or do
they just entangle courts in squabbles youths soon outgrow?
The plaintiffs in the four major student speech cases are a striking
mix. Some remained activists, while others became largely apolitical;
and for some more than others, the litigation remained a source of
identity. And of the three who lost at the Court, only one truly felt
defeated; others found vindication from less famous litigation events, or
from non-litigation victories. But all remain proud of their speech cases.
1. The Tinker Plaintiffs: Moving On, but to Different Degrees
The sole school speech plaintiffs to win at the Supreme Court, the
Tinker plaintiffs never actually won their lawsuit—a fact oddly absent
from the decades of writings on Tinker. The Supreme Court just
reversed a pretrial dismissal and remanded for trial, or perhaps further
pretrial proceedings. But four decades later, they were unsure of the
status of the $1 nominal damages their lawsuit sought. They still “joke
about ‘when it does show up,’” John said.321 “If anyone got the $1.00,”
Chris Eckhardt mused, “maybe it was Dan,” their lawyer Dan
Johnston.322 But Mary Beth Tinker recalled that somehow there never
was any trial after the big Supreme Court victory reviving the claim,
319.
320.
321.
322.

Brief for Respondents, supra note 37, at *18–19.
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 35, at *3.
Telephone Interview with John Tinker (Aug. 6, 2010).
Interview with Christopher Eckhardt (July 5, 2010) (on file with author).
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and attorney Johnston clarified that “[t]here were no proceedings after
the S.Ct. [sic] decision” for very practical reasons: “I was not
particularly interested in rubbing the Trial Judge’s nose in it,” and “the
defendants complied” with the ruling disallowing their armband ban.323
The plaintiffs agree that it would have been pointless to litigate further,
against a school they had since left, after their precedent-setting
Supreme Court victory. “[T]he change in the climate of the public
schools after the ruling . . . was the most significant thing,” Mary Beth
explained.324
When told he technically never won the suit—in this author’s
interview with him—John Tinker laughed and said, over four decades
after his case, “I never thought of that!”325 But he expressed the same
sentiment as his sister: they won the battle that counted.326
The three plaintiffs have led very different lives since their case; all
remained activists, but some in a more mainstream way than others.
Christopher Eckhardt has had an eclectic range of undertakings, but a
common thread is his focus on issue debate and children’s welfare.
After selling insurance for a time, he started a small newspaper called
“Pax Today,” then moved to Canada for a job assessing children in
maximum security correctional facilities.327 Returning to Iowa, he
became a child-care coordinator at Iowa Children and Family Services,
hosted a cable talk show called “Eckhardt’s Enquiry,” and was a family
crisis mediator.328 Moving to Florida to care for his parents, he worked
in child support collections for the state and earned a political science
degree.329 Most recently, he is writing and distributing online a novel,
The Baker Act Conspiracy. Based on a true story, it details one man’s
crusade against medical abuse and financial corruption at a now-closed
Florida psychiatric hospital where Eckhardt worked in the 1990s.330 He
still takes pride in his role in “setting the precedent for [s]tudent
[r]ights.”331
John Tinker, also proud, called the lawsuit “very fulfilling” in a 2005

323. Interview with Dan Johnston, supra note 206.
324. E-mail from Mary Beth Tinker to Scott A. Moss (July 5, 2010) (on file with author).
325. Interview with John Tinker, supra note 321.
326. Id.
327. Biography of Christopher Eckhardt, AM. BAR ASS’N DIVISION FOR PUB. EDUC.,
http://abapubliceducation.org/publiced/lawday/tinker/chrisbio.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. E-mail from Christopher Eckhardt to Scott A. Moss (Aug. 7, 2010) (on file with
author); see also THE BAKER ACT CONSPIRACY, http://www.thebakeractconspiracy.com (last
visited Sept. 16, 2011).
331. Christopher Eckhardt, Tinker vs. Des Moines: The True Story, KNOL (Jul. 24, 2008,
7:00 AM), http://knol.google.com/k/tinker-vs-des-moines#.
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college speech with Mary Beth.332 But more than his co-plaintiffs,
Tinker has continued to walk a nontraditional path. He dropped out of
the University of Iowa, claiming disillusionment with society during the
Vietnam War, and “moved into a small truck to minimize his living
expenses.”333 He worked on a shrimp boat, then as a bus driver, then in
various electronics- and computer-related jobs, such as radio station
engineer, proprietor of an electronics store called “Inventors’ Supply,”
and then self-taught computer programmer.334 Eventually, he “bought a
large school building” in small-town Fayette, Missouri, and “turn[ed] it
into his home,”335 because he wanted space to store his collected
inventor supplies, historical papers, and family records, including
records of his mother’s activism in El Salvador and elsewhere.336 He
reports his avocation as “social observer” supporting progressive
causes, including Central American relief efforts in Nicaragua in the
1980s and the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas in the 1990s.337 Since 2007,
he has blogged political polemics against, for example, a court decision
upholding school uniform rules;338 “collusion” between House Speaker
Nancy Pelosi and President George W. Bush to conceal torture;339 and
“abuses the capitalists have visited upon the socialists” generally.340
With antimilitarism his lifelong focus, Tinker saw speech rights as “a
secondary matter. I was mostly interested in . . . the war. Freedom of
speech was a tool, not the message.”341 But he does see a link between
his speech battle and his antiwar cause: “I see the imperial project as
behind the repression of expression,” he still argues, believing
“authoritarian” forces are “clamping down on expressive behavior” to
educate only worker “drones” who do not think for themselves.342
Mary Beth Tinker has remained politically active, but in a more
mainstream way than John, more youth-focused than broadly
332. Amy Klein, First Amendment Advocates Speak About Famous Law Case, IOWA STATE
DAILY (Apr. 14, 2005, 12:00 AM), http://www.iowastatedaily.com/news/article_dfdf36ca-7ec55d8c-b0e9-ba595e749722.html.
333. Biography of John Tinker, AM. BAR ASS’N DIVISION FOR PUB. EDUC., http://abapublic
education.org/publiced/lawday/tinker/johnbio.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Interview with John Tinker, supra note 321.
337. Biography of John Tinker, supra note 333.
338. John Tinker, Ninth Circuit Panel Decision in Favor of School Uniforms,
JOHNTINKER.COM BLOG (May 20, 2008, 10:16 PM), http://johntinker.com/2008/05/20/ninthcircuit-panel-decision-in-favor-of-school-uniforms/.
339. John Tinker, Nancy Pelosi and Torture, JOHNTINKER.COM BLOG (May 8, 2009, 8:27
PM) http://johntinker.com/2009/05/08/nancy-pelosi-and-torture/.
340. John Tinker, Another Other Boondoggle, JOHNTINKER.COM BLOG (Sept. 19, 2008,
11:01 AM), http://johntinker.com/2008/09/19/another-other-boondoggle/.
341. John Tinker, supra note 47.
342. Interview with John Tinker, supra note 321.
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antigovernment. The litigation was more sedate for her because she
moved to St. Louis before the Supreme Court decision; her new school
“did not really give it much attention.”343 She became a nursepractitioner, mostly in pediatrics, and remained politically active,344
taking on speaking engagements addressing “students and others
throughout the country about the rights of young people.”345 “I still
work as a nurse,” she reported in 2010, “but now I spend most of my
time on civic education and students’ rights.”346
2. Fraser: Losing at the Court, but Feeling Victorious
Matt Fraser felt like a winner. His speech worked: the candidate for
whom he advocated, Jeff Kuhlman, overwhelmingly won the
election.347 And despite losing at the Supreme Court, Fraser was the
only one of the school speech plaintiffs to win a District Court
preliminary injunction—which cleared Fraser’s record and reinstated
his elected role as a graduation speaker.348 A perfect example of how
appellate reversals of fortune may do little for the parties, the Bethel
School District’s Supreme Court victory likely rang hollow—and came
too late to undercut Fraser’s victorious self-image. His election as
graduation speaker came after his off-color speech and suspension,349
and the student newspaper’s last issue his senior year was a virtual “ode
to Matt Fraser”; in short, the school “martyred [him].”350
Fraser “thought about law school,” but his case left him
“disenchanted with the legal system . . . and how ill-informed many of
the various adults seemed, particularly many members of the Supreme
Court,”351 because “at oral argument it was obvious that they were not
really well prepared . . . . The lack of depth of the questions was
noticeable.”352 He looks back with no regrets; all he would do
differently is procure “experienced Supreme Court litigators” to work
with the “very able litigator” who represented him.353
Yet for all his righteousness, Fraser was the sole school speech
plaintiff who pressed no issue other than the right to off-color speech:
343. Questions & Answers: Perspectives Then, supra note 50.
344. Biography of Mary Beth Tinker, AM. BAR ASS’N DIVISION FOR PUB. EDUC.,
http://abapubliceducation.org/publiced/lawday/tinker/mbbio.html, (last visited Sept. 19, 2011).
345. E-mail from Mary Beth Tinker, supra note 324.
346. Id.
347. E-mail from Matthew Fraser to Scott A. Moss (July 16, 2010) (on file with author).
348. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 43 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 679 (1986); E-mail from Matthew
Fraser, supra note 347.
349. E-mail from Matthew Fraser, supra note 347.
350. Hudson, supra note 117 (quoting Fraser) (internal quotation marks omitted).
351. E-mail from Matthew Fraser, supra note 347.
352. Hudson, supra note 117.
353. E-mail from Matthew Fraser, supra note 347.
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the Tinkers and Eckhardt were early protestors of a war; Kuhlmeier was
publishing on difficult issues in students’ lives; and even Frederick’s
silly banner was part of his broader challenge to the authority of a
school prone to heavy-handed tactics of dubious legality, such as
unconstitutionally threatening a student for abstaining from the Pledge
and threatening a trespass arrest for reading in the courtyard while off
from class. Now Executive Director of the debate program at Stanford
University, and a longtime debate coach,354 Fraser has made speech his
career, decades after bringing the sole school speech case that was only
about speech itself.
3. Kuhlmeier: Disillusioned, but Standing by Her Actions
Cathy Kuhlmeier maintained neither the Tinker plaintiffs’ ongoing
engagement nor Fraser’s sense of moral victory. “She did not attend
oral arguments because she says her attorney . . . did not maintain
sufficient contact.”355 Neither did her experience lead to lifelong issue
advocacy or debating, unlike the Tinker and Fraser plaintiffs. She lost
at the Supreme Court the same year she graduated college with a Mass
Communications degree,356 and “the ordeal . . . left a ‘bad taste’ in her
mouth for journalism.”357 She went on to a life raising seven children,
working as a preschool teacher, and eventually becoming a riskmanagement official for a major sporting goods retailer.358
Lacking the ultimate victory of the Tinker plaintiffs, the early-stage
practical victory of Fraser, or the post hoc vindication of Frederick,
Cathy Kuhlmeier Frey has moved on more completely. But she remains
proud of her case and still speaks on it: “I’ve been to a lot of schools to
speak to journalism classes and . . . my daughter’s high school,” she
said; “I’ve been the topic of some Google searches by her and her
friends, and they can’t believe that was me.”359 She remembers one
college speech especially fondly: “a student came up to me and said I
can’t believe I’m meeting a freedom fighter and asked for my
autograph. I was pretty shocked by that because I had never thought of
myself as that person.”360 For her 1983 stand against her school, she
credits the departed journalism teacher who referred her to the ACLU:
“I had the courage to stand up for my rights because of our teacher
354. Executive Home and Office Staff, STANFORD NAT’L FORENSIC INST.,
http://www.snfi.org/staff (last visited Aug. 7, 2011).
355. Hudson, supra note 135.
356. E-mail from Cathy Kuhlmeier Frey to Scott A. Moss (July 7, 2010) (on file with
author).
357. Hudson, supra note 135.
358. E-mail from Cathy Kuhlmeier Frey, supra note 356.
359. Id.
360. Id.
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Robert Stergos.”361 And despite her loss, she “wouldn’t change a thing”
about her actions: “If people don’t challenge things they don’t agree
with, how can we expect things to ever change? I still stand up for what
I believe in and this case has really been a key factor in the person I’ve
become.”362
4. Morse: Ultimately Successful in Litigation, but Forced to Leave
More than for the other school speech plaintiffs, Joe Frederick’s
Court loss is only part of his story. One seemingly minor epilogue gave
Frederick the moral victory he wanted from the start: to infuriate school
officials with anti-authority speech they could not stop. Only after
publication did Principal Morse see the anarchist poem Frederick wrote
for the JDHS 2002 yearbook:
just one huge freedomless controlled entity . . .
. . . the time has come to take the final stand piss into the
wind of illusionary sin release chaos into the land . . .
. . . governments must fall civilization awaits our move no
time to stall lets [sic] tear down the walls . . .
. . . and let the chaos soothe . . . .363
“Ms. Morse was livid,” Frederick said; “I was suspended for the
remainder of the day. I went home very pleased . . . how upset [she] was
over being too late to censor my poem.”364
Frederick also enjoyed more tangible vindication: a $50,000
settlement. Despite losing at the Supreme Court, Frederick kept
litigating his free speech claim under the Alaska Constitutional
provision: “Every person may freely speak, write, and publish on all
subjects.”365 Oddly, pressing a state claim similar to a losing federal
constitutional claim occasionally works for abortion, criminal defense,
and other rights366—and it worked for Frederick. In November 2008,
the school district agreed to pay $45,000 to Frederick and $5,000 “to
hire a neutral constitutional law expert to chair a forum on student
speech.”367 Frederick flew in from China for the forum and “got a
361. PANCHYK, supra note 98, at 62.
362. E-mail from Cathy Kuhlmeier Frey, supra note 356.
363. Frederick, supra note 168.
364. Id.
365. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1.5.
366. See Scott A. Moss & Douglas M. Raines, The Intriguing Federalist Future of
Reproductive Rights, 88 B.U. L. REV. 175 (2008) (summarizing parallel federal/state claims).
367. Eric Morrison, School Board, Frederick Reach Settlement in ‘Bong Hits’ Case,
JUNEAU EMPIRE (Nov. 5, 2008), http://juneauempire.com/stories/110508/loc_352352563.shtml.
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standing ovation, which did not make the school officials happy,” his
lawyer Douglas Mertz said; “[w]e take our consolations where we can
find them.”368
But a settlement and a hero’s welcome back at school did not give
Frederick a happy ending. Frederick claimed that during his school
suspension, police repeatedly harassed him for embarrassing Juneau
with his banner.
Frederick was arrested by Juneau police and charged with
trespass while parked at the municipal swimming pool next
to the high school, waiting to pick up his
girlfriend. . . . [C]harges were dropped. . . . [For] failing to
signal a left turn[,] . . . [p]olice took him to jail, saying he’d
failed to pay an old fine . . . . The charge was
dropped . . . [as] clerical error . . . . Frederick accused the
school and police of retaliating because of his
banner . . . [and received] a $22,000 settlement.369
In a remarkable, unfortunate coincidence, Joe’s father Frank was “a
risk manager for the school district’s insurance company[,] . . . facing
big legal fees because of the [banner] suit.”370 Frank “shield[ed] himself
from anything touching on the legal case” but claimed he was demoted,
then fired, “for not pressuring his son to drop his lawsuit.”371 He sued
and won $200,000, plus legal fees.372 But with Frank “blackballed from
[his] industry, basically unemployable,” attorney Mertz recounted, “the
Fredericks were broke,”373 and “[w]ith no aid from his father,
Joe . . . dropped out” of college.374
Frederick later graduated from another college, and he and his father
both found jobs teaching English in China.375 He also attended a
Chinese university—and caroused a good bit, judging by his public
MySpace webpage; photos show him dancing with a woman holding a
beer, singing into a microphone, holding a vodka bottle, etc.376 Though
abroad, Frederick has not hid from his case: his webpage,
“www.myspace.com/bonghits4jesus,” includes a photo of the banner.377
The page also lists his favorite authors: Albert Camus, whom he was
368. E-mail from Douglas Mertz to Scott A. Moss (June 28, 2010) (on file with author).
369. Kizzia, supra note 161.
370. Id.
371. Id.; Barnes, supra note 7.
372. Kizzia, supra note 161; E-mail from Douglas Mertz, supra note 368.
373. E-mail from Mertz, supra note 368.
374. Kizzia, supra note 161.
375. Id.
376. Joseph Frederick, Joseph Frederick, MYSPACE.COM, http://www.myspace.com/
bonghits4jesus (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
377. Id.
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reading at school when accused of “trespass”; and F. Scott Fitzgerald,
author of The Great Gatsby378—the tale of a disillusioned young man
who, like Frederick, travels far to escape norms he finds stifling.
CONCLUSION
This Article’s thesis—that numerous notionally landmark Supreme
Court decisions have far less effect on the law and on the parties than
assumed—should not be overstated. On the law: Many Supreme Court
decisions do heavily reshape the legal landscape, of course. Some
establish a major new right—Miranda rights for criminal suspects,379
abortion rights under Roe v. Wade,380 and proscription of the death
penalty for minors381 or for non-murderers.382 Others importantly
eliminate a major individual right, such as the more recent cases
limiting the abortion rights Roe established383 and limiting the scope of
the exclusionary rule in criminal prosecutions.384
On the individual level: Certainly many decisions are among the
most monumental events in the litigant’s life. The importance of a death
penalty decision to the individual cannot be overstated. Various other
judicial decisions are life-altering, such as decisions on an individual’s
right to an abortion, though many abortion or other individual rights
decisions, including Roe itself, come only after the matter is mooted for
the individual litigant, making the case important as a precedent but not
for the individual at the center of the storm.385 I also would not suggest
to Al Gore that Bush v. Gore did not have a major impact, both on his
life and on American history.386
But the school speech cases are excellent exemplars of the wide
range of limits on the legal and human impact of Supreme Court
decisions. Tinker established an important right, but one that proved
harder to enforce at the retail level, where local lawyers shy away from
cases pressing constitutional principles for little monetary relief. The
three post-Tinker cases are a striking stream of authority reining in the
right Tinker established, but lower courts remained able to enforce
378. Id.
379. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
380. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
381. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
382. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (barring death penalty for crimes other
than murder or possibly crimes against the state, defined broadly).
383. E.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
384. See supra note 29.
385. Roe, 410 U.S. at 125 (holding that “the termination of [Roe’s] 1970 pregnancy has not
rendered her case moot”).
386. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (ending Florida’s recount of state votes for the 2000 U.S.
presidential election between candidates Al Gore and George W. Bush).
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Tinker rights for various reasons: the three later cases declined to
overrule Tinker outright; speech rights claims are so fact-specific that
particular cases seem better governed by the Tinker rule than the
Fraser, Kuhlmeier, or Morse exceptions; and none of the three postTinker cases the Court has heard are typical of the types of
controversies increasingly common in the lower courts, such as online
postings and religious (or otherwise conservative) speech.
Finally, while the school speech plaintiffs all remain proud of their
controversial youthful speech, years or even decades later, the Court
outcomes have strikingly little correlation with how vindicated or
defeated each feels. John and Mary Beth Tinker and Chris Eckhardt,
while viewing their Court victory as vindication, did not even remember
how or why they never pursued their case to a verdict. Matt Fraser felt
like a winner because the later reversal of his preliminary injunction
victory did not change the fact that he won a district court order
reinstating him as a graduation speaker, to the chagrin of school
officials. Joe Frederick’s Court loss was followed by a rich,
multichapter epilogue: he won a settlement on remand on his state law
claim; he pulled off other controversial speech his principal could not
keep from getting published; he won a settlement and his father won a
court verdict, in separate lawsuits claiming retaliation by their local
officials; yet Joe’s litigation and his father’s job loss were financially
crushing, forcing both to leave the country to find work, though Joe
seemed to enjoy his travels abroad. So the Tinker plaintiffs have lived
the lives of winners despite never receiving a verdict, while the losing
Morse and Fraser plaintiffs drew substantial vindication from lessfamed battles than their Court appeals. Only Cathy Kuhlmeier, the least
famous of the six plaintiffs in the four cases, felt such a sense of defeat
from her loss that she went from firebrand student to apolitical adult.
But even Kuhlmeier feels a sense of pride in having fought the fight, in
having her children and their friends express surprise when they Google
her, and in being called a “freedom fighter” by admiring teenagers who,
for all anyone knows, could well be the next Tinker, Eckhardt, Fraser,
Kuhlmeier, or Frederick.
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